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Article
Probate-Error Costs
MARK GLOVER
Because a will’s authenticity is never certain, courts sometimes make
incorrect determinations regarding whether a purported will is a genuine
expression of the decedent’s intent. When the court incorrectly admits an
inauthentic will to probate, a false-positive outcome occurs. Conversely,
when the court incorrectly denies probate of an authentic will, a falsenegative outcome occurs. Because false-positive outcomes grant probate of
inauthentic wills and false-negative outcomes deny probate of authentic
wills, both can be characterized as “probate errors.”
Probate errors are inevitable, and consequently policymakers must
decide how to balance the risk of false-positive outcomes and falsenegative outcomes. With the aim of aiding policymakers in this decision,
this Article uses decision theory to systematically analyze how the risk of
probate errors should be balanced. Decision theory suggests that, to
identify the proper goal of a decision-making process, one must compare
the error costs of false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes. If
error costs are symmetric, then the decision-making process should be
designed to minimize the total risk of error. However, if error costs are
asymmetric, then the decision-making process should be designed to
minimize the more costly type of error.
This Article argues that probate-error costs were previously
asymmetric, with false-positive outcomes being more costly than falsenegative outcomes. It therefore explains why the law’s conventional
method of will authentication minimizes the risk of false-positive outcomes
at the expense of an increased risk of false-negative outcomes. More
importantly, it argues that probate-error costs have changed so that they
are now more symmetric. The recognition of this shift suggests that the
goal of will authentication should be increased accuracy and therefore that
reform of the conventional law is needed.
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Probate-Error Costs
MARK GLOVER*
INTRODUCTION
The method by which probate courts authenticate wills necessarily
strikes a balance between false-positive outcomes and false-negative
outcomes. A false-positive outcome occurs when the probate court
validates an inauthentic will.1 Conversely, a false-negative outcome occurs
when the court invalidates an authentic will.2 Because false-positive
outcomes grant probate of inauthentic wills and false-negative outcomes
deny probate of authentic wills, both can be characterized as “probate
errors.”3
No method of differentiating authentic wills from inauthentic wills is
perfect; indeed, probate errors are inevitable.4 But once this inevitability is
recognized, policymakers must decide how to balance the risk of falsepositive outcomes with the risk of false-negative outcomes.5 Perhaps they
*
Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law
School, 2011; J.D., magna cum laude, Boston University School of Law, 2008. Thanks to Kevin
Bennardo and commenters at the Rocky Mountain Junior Scholars Forum, particularly Ian Farrell,
Matthew Jennejohn, and Maybell Romero, for helpful feedback on an earlier draft of this Article.
Thanks also to the Carl M. Williams Faculty Research Fund and the University of Wyoming College of
Law for research support.
1
See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 153 (9th ed.
2013) (“[A false-positive is] a spurious finding of authenticity . . . .”); Daniel B. Kelly, Toward
Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 855, 880 (2012) (“False
positives . . . involve probating documents that are not animated by testamentary intent . . . .”); Robert
H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 647
(2014).
2
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153 (explaining that a false-negative occurs when
a court denies probate despite “overwhelming evidence of authenticity”); Kelly, supra note 1, at 880
(“False negatives . . . involve not probating documents that are animated by testamentary intent . . . .”);
Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647.
3
Mark Glover, Minimizing Probate-Error Risk, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335, 338 (2016).
False-positive outcomes are sometimes referred to as Type I errors, and false-negative outcomes are
sometimes referred to as Type II errors. E.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of
Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1504 (1999).
4
See Glover, supra note 3, at 368 (“Because of the evidentiary difficulties of probate . . . [u]nder
any system, probate errors will occur.”).
5
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 147–48 (“The challenge is to prescribe a set of
formalities, and a rule for the exactness with which those formalities must be complied, that balances
the risk of probating an inauthentic will with the risk of denying probate to an authentic will.”);
Katheleen R. Guzman, Intents and Purposes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 305, 309 (2011) (“Where perfection
is unattainable, this ‘hard place’ ‘between over- or under-inclusion errors’ is familiar yet frighteningly
irreversible.”); see also Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
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should craft the law so that most probate errors that occur are false-positive
outcomes.6 Alternatively, perhaps most probate errors that occur should be
false-negative outcomes.7 Or maybe the goal should be to strike an
intermediate balance between false-positive outcomes and false-negative
outcomes.8
The appropriate tradeoff between these two types of probate errors
depends in part upon their relative costs.9 On the one hand, if false-positive
outcomes are worse than false-negative outcomes, then a method of will
authentication that produces probate errors that are mostly false-negative
outcomes might be appropriate. On the other hand, if false-negative
outcomes are worse than false-positive outcomes, then a method of will
authentication that produces probate errors that are mostly false-positive
outcomes might be appropriate. If all probate errors are equally costly, then
the law’s goal might be to strike a tradeoff between false-positive
outcomes and false-negative outcomes that minimizes the overall rate of
error. Accordingly, to accurately assess what the goal of the law’s method
of will authentication should be, a clear picture of the costs of both falsepositive outcomes and false-negative outcomes is required.
A careful examination of probate-error costs has been needed for some
time. Over the last several decades a reform movement has sought to
change the way in which the law authenticates wills.10 Critics argue that
the conventional law produces too many false-negative outcomes,11 and
they suggest that reform is needed so that probate errors are more evenly

1495, 1521 (2001) (“Systems that operate under uncertainty always balance type I and type II errors—
false positives . . . and false negatives . . . .”); see generally Glover, supra note 3 (analyzing potential
methods of will-execution reform).
6
Some have argued that this is the appropriate allocation of probate-error risk. See, e.g.,
Guzman, supra note 5, at 309 (“[S]electing rules that risk over-inclusion by favoring the identification
of testamentary intent—and therefore wills——is the better choice . . . .”).
7
The conventional law allocates probate-error risk in this way. See Glover, supra note 3, at 341–
43 (discussing the “highly formalized will-execution process”); see also infra notes 69–77 and
accompanying text.
8
The reform movement argues that probate errors should be balanced so as to minimize the
overall rate of error. See Glover, supra note 3, at 348–67 (arguing that “the method for determining a
will’s authenticity should be designed to make correct determinations as frequently as possible”); see
also infra notes 78–84 and accompanying text.
9
See Glover, supra note 3, at 348–49 (explaining that “[i]f one type of error is more costly than
the other, minimization of the total number of errors is not necessarily the appropriate goal of the law”).
10
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 179–85 (discussing the emergence of the
substantial compliance doctrine and the harmless-error rule); Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 646–48
(explaining that the “[m]odern law has shifted the balance . . . by reducing the number of required
formalities and by relaxing the exactness with which they must be satisfied”).
11
See Glover, supra note 3, at 346–48 (discussing Professor John Langbein’s critique of the
“overly formalistic” conventional law); see also, e.g., John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with
the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 498–503 (1975) (“[T]he rule of literal compliance with the Wills
Act formalities is the doctrinal consequence of the inferior status of the probate courts.”).
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distributed between false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes.12
Implicit in the reform movement’s argument is the idea that all probate
errors are equally costly,13 but until recently, the role that probate-error
costs play in shaping the law of wills has not been explicitly discussed.14
Because no thorough analysis of probate-error costs has occurred, the
reform movement has not fully explained the need for change.
This Article therefore seeks to more fully develop the case for altering
the way that probate courts authenticate wills. By systematically evaluating
the relative costs of false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes,
this Article provides a better understanding of why the conventional law
strikes a false-negative-heavy tradeoff of probate errors.15 More
importantly, this Article’s analysis of probate-error costs bolsters the
argument that the modern law of wills should pursue a more balanced
tradeoff between false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes.16
This Article proceeds in three Sections. Section I describes the role
that error costs play in shaping the law. Specifically, Section I uses the
context of criminal adjudication to illustrate how error costs can affect the
law’s tradeoff between false-positive outcomes and false-negative
outcomes. Section I also introduces the debate and reform movement
surrounding probate errors. Sections II and III then turn the Article’s focus
specifically toward probate-error costs. Section II explains how
asymmetric probate-error costs provide a rationale for the conventional
law’s preference for false-negative outcomes. Section III then argues that a
shift toward symmetric probate-error costs has changed the way in which
the law should authenticate wills.

12
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 881–82 (“[T]he harmless error rule and reformation doctrine appear
to reduce the probability of Type II errors without substantially increasing the likelihood of Type I
errors. . . . Thus, [they] may be superior to strict compliance . . . [and] to the no reformation rule . . . .”).
13
See Glover, supra note 3, at 348–49 (explaining that unlike in the criminal law context, where
false-positive outcomes are considered very costly, “false-positive outcomes are generally just as costly
as false-negative outcomes within the probate context”).
14
See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 148 (addressing compliance with
formalities and how both errors dishonor “the decedent’s freedom of disposition”); Glover, supra note
3, at 348–49 (advocating for a “broader system for differentiating authentic wills from inauthentic
wills,” as opposed to focusing on inequities in specific cases); Kelly, supra note 1, at 879–80
(highlighting the dependence on “the trade-off between error costs and decision costs” in selecting the
desirable doctrine); Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The
Search for a Compromise between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 463
(2002) (arguing for a standard of clear and convincing proof of testamentary intent where “an
erroneous decision upholding an informal will is substantially more costly than an erroneous decision
rejecting an informal will”); Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647 (identifying the challenge in prescribing a set
of formalities that balances both risks).
15
Infra Section II.
16
Infra Section III.
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I. ERROR COSTS AND THE LAW
Error costs are a component of a larger analytical framework known as
decision theory, which seeks to identify the optimal process for making
decisions under conditions of uncertainty.17 Courts are decision makers;18
they make all sorts of determinations, such as whether a defendant is guilty
or innocent, whether a custody arrangement is in the best interests of the
child, and whether a decedent had the capacity to execute a will. Under
conditions of perfect information, the court’s decision-making process
would be straightforward. It would simply apply the facts to the law and
reach the appropriate legal conclusion.19 For example, a defendant who
killed another person with the intent to do so would be found guilty of
murder. The court’s decision would not be hampered by uncertain facts.
However, courts must make decisions under uncertain conditions.20
Oftentimes objective facts, such as whether a defendant actually killed a
victim, are unclear.21 Moreover, certainty is unattainable when the court
must determine someone’s subjective intent,22 such as whether a defendant
17
See C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67
ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 41–42 (1999) (“Decision theory sets out a process for making factual
determinations and decisions when information is costly and therefore imperfect. It formulates a
methodology for determining when to make decisions on the basis of current information and when to
gather and consider further information before making a decision.”); Keith N. Hylton & Michael
Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469, 498 (2001)
(“Decision theory provides a powerful framework for understanding situations in which choices among
alternative actions must be based on imperfect information. It helps us understand the tradeoffs
between, in effect, convicting the innocent and absolving the guilty.”); John Kaplan, Decision Theory
and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1065 (1968) (“[T]he typical decision-theory
problem involves the proper course of action to be taken by a decisionmaker who may gain or lose by
taking action upon uncertain data that inconclusively support or discredit differing hypotheses about the
state of the real but nonetheless unknowable world.”).
18
Beckner & Salop, supra note 17, at 43.
19
See Michael Owens, Comment, A Cure for Collusive Settlements: The Case for a Per Se
Prohibition on Pay-for-Delay Agreements in Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 78 MO. L. REV. 1353,
1380 (2013) (“In a world of perfect information, whether a certain activity should be permitted or
enjoined would depend on a straightforward application of appropriate law to the facts of a given
case.”).
20
See Beckner & Salop, supra note 17, at 43 (“A court inevitably must make its decisions on the
basis of limited and imperfect information. As a result, a court can never be absolutely certain that its
factual findings are correct, the correct litigant prevails, or the remedy it mandates still would be the
best outcome if all the facts were known.”); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of
Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1243 (1985) (“Realistically, the
courts cannot obtain perfect information about parties and their acts.”).
21
See Richard Litvin, Fearful Asymmetry: Employee Free Choice and Employer Profitability in
First National Maintenance, 58 IND. L.J. 433, 484 (1983) (“Legal proof, even of objective facts, is
inherently uncertain.”).
22
See Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 656 (1988)
(explaining that intestacy statutes “suffer[] from the impossible search for subjective intent”); Jan
Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending Entry into Force: Toward Manifest
Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 283, 303 (2001) (“[A]s a philosophical truism, it may be well-nigh
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who killed a victim intended to do so. Because courts must make decisions
based upon imperfect information, decision-making processes guide them
when making decisions.23 These decision-making processes are composed
of presumptions of fact, burdens of persuasion, standards of proof, and
procedural and evidentiary rules.24 For instance, the law places the burden
to prove a defendant’s guilt upon the prosecution, a burden that the
prosecution must discharge beyond a reasonable doubt.25 If the prosecution
satisfies this burden, the court finds the defendant guilty; if it does not, the
court finds the defendant not guilty.
Decision theory suggests that the optimal decision-making process for
a given determination must weigh the benefits of making better decisions
with the costs of obtaining and processing additional information.26 A
decision-making process reaches better decisions when it minimizes
expected error costs.27 Expected error costs are a product of the likelihood
of an erroneous decision and the cost of that erroneous decision.28 If falsepositive outcomes and false-negative outcomes are equally costly, a
decision-making process that minimizes the overall rate of error produces
the lowest expected error costs.29 Under this scenario, minimization of
impossible to identify someone else’s subjective intent; to paraphrase an ancient maxim, not even the
devil knows what is inside a man’s head.”).
23
See Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 53 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1109, 1151–52 (2010) (explaining that decision-making tools “are designed by the legal system
to compensate for imperfect information, which causes uncertainty”).
24
See Beckner & Salop, supra note 17, at 43–44 (“Through experience, courts create
presumptions to guide their factual investigations and decision making. In addition, courts can gather
information. In our adversarial system . . . the fact gathering is literally carried out by the parties, not
the court. A court, however, exerts significant control over information gathering by creating a process
of discovery and issue formulation that affects the amount and accuracy of the information.”); Mullally,
supra note 23, at 1151 (“[A]djustment of burdens of proof, burdens of persuasion, and presumptions
would be effective tools if reformers simply want to increase certainty as to which party will prevail on
a given issue. Such process-oriented tools allow for systematically tipping the scales against the class
of litigants deemed most appropriate to bear the costs of uncertainty.”); Owens, supra note 19, at 1380
(“In light of this uncertainty, courts must form presumptions, impose burdens of proof, collect and
process information, make relevant findings of fact, and apply the relevant legal standards to those
findings.”).
25
See Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of
Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (1979) (“[D]ue process requires that the prosecution in a
criminal case prove each and every material element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt . .
. .”).
26
See Beckner & Salop, supra note 17, at 46 (“In evaluating investment in information, the
benefit of additional information is that it may reduce the likelihood of making a costly erroneous
decision. In this sense, the decision to consider additional information can be seen as a tradeoff
between two types of costs—error costs on the one hand and information costs on the other.”).
27
See Robert G. Bone, A Normative Evaluation of Actuarial Litigation, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 227,
248 (2011) (explaining that lowered “expected error costs” result in more “accurate outcomes”).
28
See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 873, 911 (2009) (“[T]he cost of an error discounted by the probability that it will occur.”).
29
See Frederick E. Vars, Toward a General Theory of Standards of Proof, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1,
41 (2010) (explaining that “[m]inimizing errors is an attractive goal, but only because doing so will
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expected error costs depends solely on accuracy. As long as the correct
decision is made as frequently as possible, the decision-making process
should be indifferent to whether the errors that occur are false-positive
outcomes or false-negative outcomes.
However, when one type of error is more costly than the other,
minimization of expected error costs does not depend solely on accuracy
but instead also depends upon the tradeoff between false-positive outcomes
and false-negative outcomes.30 In mathematical terms, expected error costs
can be expressed as the sum of: (1) the likelihood of a false-positive
outcome multiplied by the cost of a false-positive outcome and (2) the
likelihood of a false-negative outcome multiplied by the cost of a falsenegative outcome.31 Thus, when relative error costs are symmetric (i.e., the
cost of a false-positive outcome is equal to the cost of a false-negative
outcome), the most accurate decision-making process minimizes expected
error costs.32 By contrast, when relative error costs are asymmetric (i.e.,
one type of error is more costly than the other), the decision-making
process that strikes the appropriate tradeoff between false-positive
outcomes and false-negative outcomes minimizes expected error costs.33
While the minimization of expected error costs produces the benefit of
making better decisions, it also generates costs. To make better decisions,
courts must obtain and process additional information.34 These costs are
known as decision costs and include “any burden, such as resource
expenditure or opportunity costs, associated with reaching a decision,”
generally minimize the cost of errors” and suggesting that asymmetric error costs provide a justification
for not pursuing the goal of minimizing the total number of errors).
30
See Hylton & Salinger, supra note 17, at 502 (“Decision theory implies that the best legal rule
minimizes the overall expected costs of error. The three important factors suggested by the analysis are
the base rate probability of harm, the ratio of the false conviction to the false acquittal probability
(relative error rates), and the ratio of the false conviction to the false acquittal cost (relative error
costs).”); Todd J. Zywicki, Institutional Review Boards as Academic Bureaucracies: An Economic and
Experiential Analysis, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 861, 864 (2007) (“Error costs are minimized by the joint
minimization of the costs of Type I and Type II errors, as measured by their frequency and the severity
of harm that results from their occurrence.”).
31
Bone, supra note 28, at 911–12 n.173.
32
See Vars, supra note 29, at 41 (“Minimizing errors is an attractive goal, but only because doing
so will generally minimize the cost of errors. It is the cost, not the error itself, that matters . . . . [But]
[o]nce asymmetric costs are shown . . . [other] considerations . . . should be weighed.”).
33
See Bone, supra note 28, at 248 n.48 (“If false negatives are more costly than false positives, a
rule might reduce the error risk overall and still increase expected error costs if it reduces the less costly
type of error and increases the more costly one.”); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the CivilCriminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 24–25 (1996) (discussing the affect that asymmetric
error costs play in shaping the mechanics of criminal trials and contrasting the effect that symmetric
error costs play in shaping the mechanics of civil trials).
34
See Beckner & Salop, supra note 17, at 46 (explaining that “gather[ing] and consider[ing]
additional information” can “reduce the risk of error” and increase the likelihood of “mak[ing] a better
decision”); Owens, supra note 19, at 1380 (“The more intensive the process of gathering and using
additional information, the more likely a court can reach a correct . . . determination.”).
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including “time, money, and emotional distress from uncertainty, conflict,
worry, and the like.”35 Decision theory suggests that both the benefits and
costs of making better decisions should be considered and that the optimal
decision-making process generates the fewest overall costs,36 or, put
differently, minimizes the sum of error costs and decision costs.37
As a subcomponent of the economic analysis of law,38 decision theory
and more specifically error-cost analysis has seen widespread application.
Scholars have applied error-cost analysis to the study of a broad array of
legal fields, including antitrust,39 arbitration,40 class actions,41 intellectual
property,42 federal preemption,43 and statutory interpretation.44 But while
35
Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 616 (2006) (emphasis omitted)
(explaining further that these costs “reach[] everyone who bears these costs, whether public or private
actors”); see Beckner & Salop, supra note 17, at 44 (“In making these determinations, the court must
be mindful of the financial, time, and management costs that it is inflicting on the parties (including
third parties) and itself.”); see also Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 111
(2000) (“‘Decision costs’ is a broad rubric that might encompass direct (out-of-pocket) costs of
litigation to litigants and the judicial bureaucracy, including costs of supplying judges with information
to decide the case at hand and formulate doctrines to govern future cases; the opportunity costs of
litigation to litigants and judges (that is, the time spent on a case that could be spent on other cases);
and the costs to lower courts of implementing and applying doctrines developed at higher levels.”).
36
See Beckner & Salop, supra note 17, at 46 (“The efficiency of gathering and using additional
information depends on the cost of the information versus the benefits.”); Owens, supra note 19, at
1380–81 (“The desirability of discovering additional information . . . depends on the costs of obtaining
that information relative to the benefits of considering it.”).
37
See Beckner & Salop, supra note 17, at 46 (“A rational decision maker will try to minimize the
sum of the two types of costs. This is the second key insight of the decision theoretic approach.”);
Bone, supra note 28, at 910 (“The optimal rule from among the set of feasible alternatives is the rule
that maximizes the expected social benefit net of costs, or what is equivalent, minimizes the total of
expected social costs.”); see also Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust,
52 B.C. L. REV. 871, 879 (2011) (“[D]ecision theory’s instruction [is] to craft legal rules so as to
minimize the sum of decision and error costs.”).
38
See Beckner & Salop, supra note 17, at 43 (indicating that decision theory and error-cost
analysis are subordinate aspects of the economic analysis of the law).
39
See Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for EvidenceBased Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241, 247–49 (2012) (discussing the Chicago School’s application
of decision theory and the error-cost approach to antitrust); see also, e.g., Beckner & Salop, supra note
17, at 41–42 (discussing the role of decision theory in antitrust); Hylton & Salinger, supra note 17, at
469–70 (discussing the application of decision theory to post-Chicago tying doctrine); David
McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1185, 1186 (2005) (exploring the debate over the application of error-cost
analysis to antitrust through the lens of the several cases comprising the United States v. Microsoft
Corp. dispute).
40
See, e.g., Joshua Davis, Expected Value Arbitration, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 47, 50–51 (2004)
(applying decision theory and error-cost analysis to arbitration).
41
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1286–87 (2002) (applying error-cost analysis to class actions).
42
See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Error Costs & IP Law, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 175, 178–79
(applying error-cost analysis to IP statutes).
43
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive Theory, 16 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 205, 205–06 (2008) (applying decision theory and error-cost analysis to the doctrine of
preemption of products liability claims).

622

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:613

decision theory in general and error-cost analysis in particular can be
employed in a variety of legal contexts, criminal adjudication perhaps most
clearly exemplifies the role that relative error costs play in shaping the law.
A. The Criminal Adjudication Example
Courts must make decisions regarding the guilt or innocence of
defendants at criminal trials. In this context, courts can make correct
determinations by either convicting truly guilty defendants or acquitting
truly innocent defendants. However, because they must make decisions
with imperfect information, courts can also make incorrect determinations
of guilt or innocence by either convicting truly innocent defendants or by
acquitting truly guilty defendants. An incorrect conviction can be labeled a
false-positive outcome, and an incorrect acquittal can be labeled a falsenegative outcome.45
How the law minimizes expected error costs in the context of criminal
adjudication depends in part upon the relative costs of incorrect
determinations of guilt and innocence.46 As explained above, if incorrect
convictions and incorrect acquittals are equally costly, then a decisionmaking process that makes the correct determination as frequently as
possible minimizes expected error costs.47 However, if one type of error is
more costly than the other, then a decision-making process that strikes the
appropriate balance between false-positive outcomes and false-negative
outcomes minimizes expected error costs.48 In short, relative error costs
play an important role in identifying the optimal decision-making process
for criminal adjudication.
In this regard, false-positive outcomes in the form of wrongful
convictions are considered more costly than false-negative outcomes in the
form of erroneous acquittals.49 In the words of Justice John Marshall
44
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction
and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 662 (1992) (applying error-cost analysis to judicial
interpretation of statutes). Error-cost analysis has also occasionally been applied to the law of
succession. See, e.g., Adam Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH.
U. L. REV. 609, 633–35 (2009); Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U.
L. REV. 1039, 1043–45 (2011).
45
See Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A GameTheoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 487 (2000) (“The
wrongful conviction of an innocent defendant (a ‘false positive’) is much costlier than the wrongful
acquittal of a criminal (a ‘false negative’).”).
46
See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text.
47
See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
48
See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
49
See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352 (“[T]he law holds, that it is better that ten
guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”); Seidmann & Stein, supra note 45, at 487 (“The
wrongful conviction of an innocent defendant (a ‘false positive’) is much costlier than the wrongful
acquittal of a criminal (a ‘false negative’).”); see also Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L.
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Harlan II,
[i]n a criminal case[] . . . we do not view the social disutility
of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility
of acquitting someone who is guilty. . . . [Instead it is] a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free.50
Although Justice Harlan does not explain the difference between the costs
of false-positive outcomes and the costs of false-negative outcomes,
Professor William Stuntz nicely summarizes the rationale. He explains,
“[t]he terrible nature of prison means that the cost of incarcerating the
wrong people is very high,” but “the only injury from letting the defendant
off is the loss of deterrence coupled with any intangible harm occasioned
by the unjust result.”51 Stuntz concludes that these costs “cannot equal the
injury inflicted on the wrongly punished innocent defendant.”52 Error costs
in the context of criminal adjudication are therefore asymmetric—falsepositive outcomes in the form of wrongful convictions are more costly than
false-negative outcomes in the form of erroneous acquittals.
Because criminal adjudication error costs are asymmetric, the court’s
decision-making process strikes a tradeoff between false-positive outcomes
and false-negative outcomes that is intended to minimize expected error
costs.53 Indeed, the decision-making process that courts use within the
context of criminal adjudication is not designed to reach the correct
determination of guilt or innocence as frequently as possible but is instead
designed to minimize the likelihood of wrongful convictions.54 This
protection against false-positive outcomes is primarily achieved by
requiring the prosecution to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.55 The reasonable doubt standard of proof requires that
REV. 173, 174–75 (1997) (suggesting that wrongful convictions have been considered more costly than
wrongful acquittals throughout much of history and theology).
50
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
51
Stuntz, supra note 33, at 24–25 (explaining further that “[w]hether or not the guilty defendant
goes to jail, the victim’s harm will still exist”).
52
Id. at 25; see also Richard Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law: Common Sense
on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REV. 1619, 1665 (2001) (suggesting that the reasonable doubt standard in criminal
cases reflects “a moral judgment about the wrongfulness of inflicting the pain of criminal conviction on
people who are not guilty of crimes”).
53
See Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof: The Economics of Legal Burdens, 1997 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 25–27 (explaining that “[c]riminal cases . . . are the paradigm for asymmetrical error costs”).
54
See id. at 27 (“The Court’s imposition of the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard [in criminal
cases] can . . . be seen as an attempt to minimize error costs . . . .”); see also Stuntz, supra note 33, at
24–25 (“The terrible nature of prison means that the costs of incarcerating the wrong people is very
high. Obviously, procedures that aim to promote one-way accuracy——that avoid incarcerating
innocent defendants——help to reduce those costs.”).
55
See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958) (“There is always in litigation a margin of
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the court be nearly certain of a defendant’s guilt before reaching a
conviction.56 Thus, because the reasonable doubt standard limits
convictions to those defendants who have the highest likelihood of guilt
and results in acquittals of defendants who, although they might have some
likelihood of guilt, are not undoubtedly guilty, false-negative outcomes are
more likely than false-positive outcomes in the context of criminal
adjudication.57
In sum, criminal adjudication exemplifies how relative error costs can
shape the law and the court’s decision-making process. Because criminal
adjudication error costs are asymmetric (i.e., false-positive outcomes are
more costly than false-negative outcomes),58 the court’s decision-making
process is designed to avoid false-positive outcomes at the expense of
more false-negative outcomes.59 Put simply, the scales of justice are tilted
in favor of the defendant. The law tilts the scales of justice out of
recognition that a false-positive outcome in the form of a wrongful
conviction is worse that a false-negative outcome in the form of an
erroneous acquittal. In this way, relative error costs influence how the
court’s decision-making process is designed.
B. The Push to Minimize Probate Errors
Just as courts must make determinations regarding the guilt of

error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has
at stake an interest of transcending value—as a criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of error is
reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of
proof in the first instance, and of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in
the Guilty Plea Process: A Debate on the Merits of “Discovery” Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 587
(1999) (“[W]e require the prosecution at trial to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt precisely
because, given imperfect information, we want to maximize the protection of innocent defendants, even
at the expense of setting some guilty defendants free.”). Other aspects of criminal trials also favor the
defendant. See Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 71–77 (2008)
(explaining special trial rights afforded to criminal defendants).
56
See Stein, supra note 55, at 80 (“Criminal convictions . . . require a very high, although
numerically unstated, probability of guilt.”); see also Vars, supra note 29, at 7 (explaining that the
reasonable doubt standard requires that the factfinder be at least 90% certain of the defendant’s guilt
and suggesting it perhaps requires an even higher degree of certainty).
57
See Richard A. Bierschback & Alex Stein, Deterrence, Retributivism, and the Law of Evidence,
93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 189, 191 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/
virginialawreview.org/files/bierschbach.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8H4-AR24] (“[B]y decreasing the
incidence of false positives (erroneous convictions of the factually innocent), a ‘reasonable doubt’
standard increases the incidence of false negatives (erroneous acquittals and non-prosecutions of the
factually guilty).”); see also Stein, supra note 55, at 80 (explaining that the reasonable doubt standard
“allows many guilty defendants to go free in the interest of not convicting the innocent”).
58
See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (substantiating the asymmetric value of error
costs).
59
See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
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60

defendants at criminal trials, courts must also make determinations
regarding the authenticity of wills during the probate process.61 A will is
authentic when the decedent intended it to be a legally effective expression
of her intended testamentary gifts. If a will is authentic, the court should
grant probate so that the decedent’s intent is fulfilled; however, if the
decedent did not intend a will to be legally effective, the court should deny
probate so that the decedent’s estate is not distributed to unintended
beneficiaries.62 Probate courts must distinguish authentic wills from
inauthentic wills based upon imperfect information. Because the decedent
is dead at the time of probate, the best evidence of the decedent’s intent is
unavailable when the court makes a determination regarding a will’s
authenticity.63 The court cannot simply ask the decedent whether she
intended a particular document to constitute a legally effective will.
Because of the evidentiary difficulties of probate, the decision-making
process that courts typically use to distinguish an authentic will from an
inauthentic will relies upon an easily identifiable proxy of the decedent’s
intent. The conventional law requires that a decedent comply with a variety
of formalities to execute a legally effective will, such as the requirements
that a will be written, signed by the decedent, and attested to by two
witnesses.64 If the decedent complies with these formalities, the court
presumes that she intended the will to be legally effective and therefore
that the will is authentic.65 However, if the decedent does not comply with
the formalities of will execution, the court presumes that she did not intend
the will to be legally effective and therefore that the will is inauthentic. 66
Under the conventional rule of strict compliance, the presumption of
60
See discussion supra Section I.A (explaining how courts apply error-cost analysis to strike a
balance between false-positive and false-negative determinations of guilt).
61
See Glover, supra note 3, at 340 (“[B]efore accepting a will for probate administration and
distributing the estate according to the will’s terms, the court must decide whether the decedent
intended the will to be legally effective.”).
62
See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 643 (“The American law of succession embraces freedom of
disposition[] . . . .”).
63
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 147 (“The witness who is best able to
authenticate the will, to verify that it was voluntarily made, and to clarify the meaning of its terms is
dead by the time the court considers such issues.”)
64
See id. at 148 (stating that the conventional law of will execution also includes various
technicalities that are related to the primary formalities of writing, signature, and attestation); Glover,
supra note 3, at 342 (explaining the various technical formalities required before a will is considered
valid).
65
See Langbein, supra note 11, at 514–15 (stating that if the formalities are not complied with,
the court should look to extrinsic evidence, but does not always do so); see also Mark Glover, The
Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 139, 139 (2012) (stating that in
addition to aiding the court in identifying testamentary intent, will-execution formalities may also serve
a therapeutic function).
66
See Langbein, supra note 11, at 489 (“[O]nce a formal defect is found, Anglo-American courts
have been unanimous in concluding that the attempted will fails.”).
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inauthenticity that is triggered by a decedent’s noncompliance is
conclusive.67 Courts will not consider extrinsic evidence that suggests a
decedent intended a noncompliant will to be legally effective.68
This conventional process for determining the authenticity of wills
results in a significant risk of false-negative outcomes and little likelihood
of false-positive outcomes.69 Most people would not go through the
process of producing a written document, signing it, locating two
witnesses, and having the witnesses sign the document if they did not
intend the will to be legally effective.70 Thus, when courts rely on the
proxy of formal compliance to determine the issue of a will’s authenticity,
there is little likelihood that they will incorrectly validate inauthentic
wills.71
Although the court’s decision-making process creates a minimal risk of
false-positive outcomes, it produces a significant risk of false-negative
outcomes.72 The same formalities that provide robust evidence of
authenticity also present opportunity for will-execution blunders. Either
because of ignorance or mistake, decedents who intend to execute legally
effective wills sometimes fail to comply with the prescribed formalities.73
Because wills must be executed with a high level of formality, the
conventional law has produced a host of cases in which the court
67
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153 (“[B]y establishing a conclusive presumption
of invalidity for an imperfectly executed instrument, the strict compliance rule denies probate even if
the defect is innocuous and there is overwhelming evidence of authenticity . . . .”); Mark Glover,
Rethinking the Testamentary Capacity of Minors, 79 MO. L. REV. 69, 100–02 (2014) (“[A] decedent’s
failure to comply with the prescribed formalities invalidates the will, and the probate court will not
entertain independent evidence that suggests the decedent intended the document to constitute a legally
effective will.”).
68
See Langbein, supra note 11, at 489 (“The most minute defect in formal compliance is held to
void the will, no matter how abundant the evidence that the defect was inconsequential.”).
69
See Glover, supra note 3, at 345 (“[T]he conventional law of will-execution heavily allocates
probate-error risk in favor of false-negative outcomes.”).
70
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153 (“A competent person not subject to undue
influence, duress, or fraud is unlikely to execute an instrument in strict compliance with all of the Wills
Act formalities unless the person intends the instrument to be his will.”); Guzman, supra note 5, at 311
n.18 (“Few people would undergo [the will-execution] ceremony without holding testamentary
intent.”).
71
See Glover, supra note 3, at 342–43 (“A decedent likely would not go through the highly
formalized process of conventional will-execution without intending to leave behind a legally effective
will.”).
72
See id. at 345 (“[B]y requiring the testator to leave behind strong evidence of testamentary
intent in the form [of] a written, signed, and witnessed will, the conventional law minimizes the
likelihood that the court will validate a will that the decedent did not intend to be legally effective.”).
73
See Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s
Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411, 433–34 (2009) (“In addition to deterring
people from attempting will execution, formalities also frustrate the testamentary intent of some of
those who do try to create a valid will. Critics of strict compliance routinely argue that will formalities
frustrate testamentary intent because of the burdens they place on prospective testators, and courts
invalidate wills that they acknowledge clearly express the testator’s intent.”).
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invalidates a will because of the decedent’s noncompliance under
circumstances that strongly suggest she intended the will to be legally
effective.74 When the court relies on the decedent’s compliance as a proxy
for her intent in such situations, the court likely invalidates an authentic
will.75 In some cases, the will’s authenticity is so clear that the court
expressly acknowledges that its decision-making process produces obvious
false-negative outcomes.76 Thus, by requiring the decedent to leave behind
robust evidence of a will’s authenticity in the form of a written, signed, and
attested document, the conventional law guards against false-positive
outcomes, but by denying courts the ability to validate noncompliant wills
when extrinsic evidence strongly suggests that the will is authentic, the
conventional law produces a high risk of false-negative outcomes.77
The conventional decision-making process for distinguishing authentic
wills from inauthentic wills has drawn significant criticism in recent
years.78 Critics point to cases in which courts invalidate clearly authentic
wills and suggest that the conventional law’s high risk of false-negative
74
See Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 PA. L. REV.
1033, 1036 (1994) (“Courts have routinely invalidated wills for minor defects in form even in
uncontested cases . . . .”).
75
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153 (“[B]y establishing a conclusive presumption
of invalidity for an imperfectly executed instrument, the strict compliance rule denies probate even if
the defect is innocuous and there is overwhelming evidence of authenticity—a false negative.”);
Stephanie Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to Probate, Twenty Years Later: New Evidence for the
Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577, 578 (2007) (“In the past, a
fear of probating ‘false positives’ . . . has led to strict compliance with Wills Act formalities and denial
of probate for documents that decedents intended to constitute their wills.”).
76
See, e.g., In re Estate of Pavlinko, 148 A.2d 528, 528 (Pa. 1959) (describing the invalidation of
a will in which the decedent’s intent was clear as a “very unfortunate” result); Mann, supra note 74, at
1036 (explaining that courts invalidate wills “sometimes even while conceding—always ruefully, of
course—that the document clearly represents the wishes and intent of the testator.”).
77
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 880 (“Currently, the concern about [false-negative outcomes] may
be greater than the concern about [false-positive outcomes]. Most disputes over execution formalities . .
. seem to involve technical defects . . . with little or no risk of fraud. If these cases are representative of
all cases, perhaps there is a much greater chance of denying probate to a document the testator did
intend to be her will . . . than probating a document the testator did not intend to be her will . . . .”).
78
See Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 597, 602–11
(2014) (detailing the criticism the court faced for holding a decedent’s will invalid because she and her
husband mistakenly signed each others’ wills instead of their own); John H. Langbein, Excusing
Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate
Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (“The Wills Act is meant to implement the decedent’s intent; the
paradox in a case [that applies the rule of strict compliance] is that the Wills Act defeats that intent.”);
Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 243 (1996) (“The
argument for simplifying will formalities and forgiving ‘harmless errors’ in execution rests on the
premise that effectuating testamentary intent, and thus protecting testamentary freedom, is the primary
goal of wills law.”); James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV.
541, 541–43 (1990) (criticizing the effectiveness of the attestation requirement in regards to the case of
Smith v. Nelson, 299 S.W.2d 645 (Ark. 1957), in which there was no question of genuine testamentary
intent, but the Arkansas Supreme Court denied probate solely because only one person had witnessed
the will).
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79

outcomes is unwarranted. Although they do not typically frame the issue
in terms of probate-error risk, critics of the conventional law essentially
argue that the risk of false-negative outcomes can be reduced without
significantly increasing the risk of false-positive outcomes.80 In response to
this criticism, a reform movement has emerged that has suggested two
types of changes to the conventional law. First, the formalities of will
execution could be simplified.81 A streamlined will execution process
would still provide strong evidence of a will’s authenticity but would
reduce the likelihood of will-execution blunders.82 Second, courts could be
given discretion to validate noncompliant wills.83 By allowing courts to
validate clearly authentic yet noncompliant wills, obvious false-negative
outcomes could be avoided.84 Through these changes to the conventional
law, the reform movement seeks to decrease the risk of false-negative
outcomes without significantly increasing the risk of false-positive
outcomes, thereby making the court’s decision-making process regarding
the authenticity of wills more accurate.
Although the reform movement’s goal of accuracy intuitively seems
advantageous, decision theory suggests that accuracy is not always the
optimal objective of a decision-making process.85 As explained previously,
whether increased accuracy minimizes the expected error costs of a
particular decision-making process depends upon the relative costs of
false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes.86 If false-positive
outcomes and false-negative outcomes are equally costly, then the reform
movement’s goal of increased accuracy would reduce expected probate-

79
See Langbein, supra note 78, at 4–5 (referencing the case of Groffman, in which “the testator
signed out of the witnesses’ joint presence,” rendering the will invalid).
80
See Glover, supra note 3, at 363–66 (using statistics to explain that, with factors such as level
of formality, it is possible to reduce the risk of false-negative outcomes without significantly increasing
the risk of false-positive outcomes and that even if the risk of false-positive outcomes rises by a small
degree, it is more acceptable to have false-positive outcomes than false-negative outcomes).
81
See Fellows, supra note 22, at 615 (“States have stripped their wills statutes of many of the
formalities found in the English Statute of Frauds and the Wills Act of 1837.”).
82
See id. at 614 (“The reduction in legal formalities minimizes the number of cases in which
property owners take actions indicating that they probably intend to make a donative transfer, but,
nevertheless, fail to meet the formalities because they are unadvised or ill-advised by their attorneys.”).
83
See Lester, supra note 75, at 579–82 (suggesting that courts adopt a “harmless error rule” in
which a judge may “examine both the noncomplying document as a whole and the circumstances
surrounding the document’s execution”).
84
See id. at 579–80 (“[S]ubstantial compliance permits judges to examine a noncomplying will
and determine whether the writing, attestation, signature, or combination thereof within the
noncomplying will sufficiently performs the purpose of Wills Act formalities despite a defect in one or
more of these requirements.”).
85
See supra notes 26–37 and accompanying text.
86
See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.

2016]

PROBATE-ERROR COSTS

629

87

error costs. By contrast, if false-positive outcomes are on average more
costly than false-negative outcomes, then the conventional law’s
preference for false-negative outcomes would be consistent with the
objective of minimizing expected probate-error costs.88 Whether the reform
movement’s goal of increased accuracy results in a more optimal decisionmaking process therefore depends upon the relative costs of false-positive
outcomes and false-negative outcomes.
Despite the importance of relative error costs in determining the
optimal decision-making process for the authentication of wills, no
systematic analysis of the relative costs of probate errors has occurred. As
a result, critics of the conventional law and the reform movement have not
fully explained both the problems with the traditional way that courts
authenticate wills and the need for change. To fill this analytical void, the
remainder of this Article focuses on the costs of probate errors.
Specifically, it focuses on what is lost when the court’s decision-making
process produces false-positive outcomes by validating inauthentic wills
and when it produces false-negative outcomes by invalidating authentic
wills. Ultimately, a better understanding of the relative costs of probate
errors explains the conventional law’s preference for false-negative
outcomes and illuminates the need for reform.
II. ASYMMETRIC PROBATE-ERROR COSTS
Although no full-scale analysis of relative probate-error costs has
occurred, some scholars have briefly touched upon the subject.89 For
instance, Professor Robert Sitkoff explains that both false-positive
outcomes and false-negative outcomes “dishonor the decedent’s freedom
of disposition.”90 More specifically, he suggests that a false-positive
outcome “gives effect to a false expression of testamentary intent” and that
a false-negative outcome “denies effect to a true expression of
testamentary intent.”91 Because he views these probate-error costs as
symmetric, Sitkoff concludes that the goal of will-execution reform should
87
See supra note 29 and accompanying text (“Minimizing errors is an attractive goal, but only
because doing so will generally minimize the cost of errors. It is the cost, not the error itself, that
matters.”).
88
See Bone, supra note 27, at 248 n.48 (“If false negatives are more costly than false positives, a
rule might reduce the error risk overall and still increase expected error costs if it reduces the less costly
type of error and increases the more costly one.”).
89
See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 5, at 309 (suggesting that a change in the way courts determine a
decedent’s intent is appropriate because policymakers can make the process more accurate and “no one
will die for courts having done so”). Guzman’s take is obviously in jest.
90
Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647 (“Both kinds of error dishonor the decedent’s freedom of
disposition. The former gives effect to a false expression of testamentary intent; the latter denies effect
to a true expression of testamentary intent.”).
91
Id.
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be to make the process by which courts authenticate wills more accurate.92
Sitkoff’s articulation of relative probate-error costs contains two
assumptions. First, his analysis focuses exclusively on unintended
distributions of the decedent’s property and consequently assumes that the
only costs associated with probate errors relate to the court’s failure to
carry out the decedent’s intent.93 This assumption is founded upon the
central role that the decedent’s freedom of disposition plays in the modern
law of succession.94 Indeed, the fundamental principle of this area of law is
that the decedent has broad liberty to distribute her property upon death,
and as such, the court’s main objective is to honor the decedent’s intent. 95
A probate-error cost analysis that focuses on the extent to which the
decedent’s intent is fulfilled would therefore seem to be appropriate.
The second assumption upon which Sitkoff’s probate-error cost
analysis is based is the idea that the court’s failure to carry out the
decedent’s intent by ignoring an authentic will is equally costly as the
court’s failure to carry out the decedent’s intent by validating an
inauthentic will.96 The validity of this assumption depends upon how the
decedent’s property is distributed when a false-positive outcome occurs
and when a false-negative outcome occurs. When the court incorrectly
validates an inauthentic will, the decedent’s property is distributed
according to the terms of a will that she did not intend to be legally

92
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153 (“[T]he question [is] whether relaxing the
number of formalities, relaxing the exactness with which those formalities must be complied, or both
might reduce the rate of false negatives without increasing the rate of false positives.”).
93
See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647 (explaining the challenges of balancing the risk of probating
inauthentic wills with the risk of denying probate to an authentic will); see also DUKEMINIER &
SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 148 (explaining types of error that dishonor the decedent’s freedom of
disposition).
94
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Property owners have the nearly unrestricted right to dispose of their property
as they please.”); Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 643 (“The American law of succession embraces freedom of
disposition.”); Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53
B.C. L. REV. 877, 882–85 (2012) (explaining that “[t]he most fundamental guiding principle of
American inheritance law is testamentary freedom—that the person who owns property during life has
the power to direct its disposition at death”).
95
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 10.1 (“The controlling consideration in determining the
meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is given effect to the
maximum extent allowed by law.”).
96
See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647 (“Both kinds of error dishonor the decedent’s freedom of
disposition. The former gives effect to a false expression of testamentary intent; the latter denies effect
to a true expression of testamentary intent.”); see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 148
(reiterating that both errors dishonor freedom of disposition); Sherwin, supra note 14, at 463 (“[A]
requirement of clear and convincing proof of testamentary intent might be appropriate if an erroneous
decision upholding an informal will is substantially more costly than an erroneous decision rejecting an
informal will. From the testator’s point of view, this does not appear to be the case: an error either way
results in a disposition the testator does not want.”).
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97

effective. By contrast, when the court incorrectly invalidates an authentic
will, the decedent’s property is distributed in accordance with the default
estate plan that is laid out in the relevant jurisdiction’s intestacy statute. 98
Thus, when a false-positive outcome occurs, that decedent’s property is
distributed according to terms of a will that she did not intend to be a
legally effective expression of her intent, and when a false-negative
outcome occurs, her property is distributed according to a dispositive
scheme that she had no role in crafting. A probate-error costs analysis that
treats false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes as equally
costly could therefore be reasonable.
This Section questions the extent to which these assumptions were true
in the past. If the fulfillment of the decedent’s intent at one time competed
with other goals, then probate errors may previously have had other costs.99
A deeper understanding of alternative probate-error costs may suggest that
these costs were previously asymmetric and therefore might explain the
conventional law’s preference for false-negative outcomes. Furthermore, if
false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes previously
undermined the decedent’s freedom of disposition to different degrees,
then probate errors may have once been asymmetric, even if the only costs
factored into the analysis are unintended dispositions of property. Under
either scenario, the conventional law’s preference for false-negative
outcomes may have been justified.
A. The Competing Policy of Family Protection
As explained previously, freedom of disposition is the organizing
principle of the modern law of succession.100 Sitkoff’s suggestion that willexecution reform should be evaluated by a probate-error-cost analysis that
focuses on the extent to which the law honors the decedent’s freedom of
disposition therefore seems to be appropriate. However, to understand why
the conventional law is not constructed to make the most accurate
determination of a will’s authenticity, one must consider not the error costs
that are valued today, but those that were valued as the conventional law
developed. In the past, freedom of disposition did not always enjoy the

97
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 63 (“A person who dies with a will is said to die
testate. The probate property of such a person is distributed in accordance with the terms of the
person’s will.”).
98
In this situation, the decedent’s property is distributed according to the default estate plan of
intestacy if she dies with no legally effective will. Id. If the court invalidates an authentic will, but the
decedent left behind a legally effective will that was executed before the will that the court invalidated,
the decedent’s property is distributed according to the terms of the prior will. For a discussion on how
this possibility affects the analysis of relative probate-error costs, see infra Section III.B.
99
See infra Section II.A.
100
See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
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101

same elevated status, and consequently error costs other than unintended
dispositions of property likely influenced the development of the law of
will execution. When these alternative probate-error costs are recognized,
one can better appreciate the conventional law’s preference for falsenegative outcomes.
Specifically, to understand potential probate-error costs other than
unintended dispositions of property, one must consider that family
protectionism has competed with freedom of disposition for influence over
the development of the law of succession.102 Although freedom of
disposition long ago emerged as the primary policy objective of the law,
the decedent does not have absolute freedom to distribute her property
upon death,103 and many of the limitations that the law places on the
decedent’s freedom of disposition are justified as family protection
measures.104 For example, one major limitation on the decedent’s freedom
of disposition is the forced spousal share, which requires a deceased spouse
to give a portion of her estate to her surviving spouse.105 Even if the
decedent leaves behind an indisputably authentic will that unambiguously
expresses her intended estate plan, the law will not allow her to disinherit
her surviving spouse. This limitation on freedom of disposition is based in
part upon the notion that the decedent has a duty to provide for her
surviving spouse after death,106 and the law forces the decedent to fulfill
101

See infra notes 119–127 and accompanying text.
See Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 209
(2001) (“Donative freedom is a principal value in the American system of inheritance. But . . . even it
can become a ‘myth’ when a testator attempts to leave property to those closest by affective rather than
by blood or marital ties.”); E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent
Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 275, 276 (1999) (“[T]he doctrines of mental capacity, undue influence and testamentary fraud
incorporate a rational bias in favor of the testator’s legal spouse and close blood relations. This bias,
sensible though it may be, imperils any estate plan that disfavors the testator’s legal spouse or close
blood relations in favor of non-family beneficiaries.”).
103
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c
(AM LAW INST. 2003); Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1158–65 (2013) (elaborating on justifications for restricting
testamentary freedom).
104
See Kelly, supra note 103, at 1181 (“[S]everal limitations on testamentary freedom involve
family members and relatives. The spousal elective share prevents a donor from disinheriting a
surviving spouse. The law prohibits conditional bequests that create unreasonable restraints on
marriage. And courts have invalidated terms that interfere with the mother-child relationship, sibling
interaction, and other family relationships.”).
105
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 512–14 (explaining the elective share of a
surviving spouse); Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH
L. REV. 1227, 1246 (reporting that forty of forty-one separate property states have forced spousal share
statutes).
106
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 514–15 (“The primary justification for the
elective share is that the surviving spouse contributed to the decedent’s spouse’s acquisition of wealth.
This reflects a partnership theory of marriage. An older and narrower justification for the elective share
is that marriage entails a support obligation that continues after death. Both theories justify the
102
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this duty even if doing so contravenes her unequivocal intent.
While the role that family protectionism has played in the development
of the forced spousal share is relatively clear, its influence in shaping the
law’s method of will authentication is less straightforward. Yet, with some
effort, the conventional law of will execution can be viewed as a limitation
on the decedent’s freedom of disposition that is based upon the policy of
family protection. By requiring the testator to strictly comply with a variety
of formalities, the conventional law of will execution impedes the
decedent’s exercise of this freedom.107 The decedent cannot simply
distribute property upon death in any manner she chooses; instead if she
wants to execute a will, which could potentially disinherit family members,
she must do so in a specifically prescribed form that communicates her
intent clearly and unambiguously.108 Some decedents attempt to exercise
their freedom of disposition in other ways, and as a result, some genuine
wills—even some that are clear and unambiguous—are denied probate
because of harmless formal defects.109 This requirement of the
conventional law increases the rate of false-negative outcomes and
decreases the overall accuracy of the will authentication process because
some genuine wills do not comply with the prescribed form.110
To understand how this preference for false-negative outcomes
furthers a family protection policy, one must understand how the
decedent’s estate is distributed in the absence of a will. When the
conventional law produces a false-negative outcome and the decedent dies
without a legally effective will,111 her estate is distributed under the default
estate plan of intestacy.112 The intestacy statutes of all states distribute the
decedent’s property within the family.113 Surviving spouses and
descendants are the primary takers under intestacy, and in their absence
surviving parents and siblings take.114 More remote relatives enjoy the
benefit of the decedent’s intestate estate when closer family members
existence of an elective share.”); Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage
into Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the DeferredCommunity-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487, 493 (2000) (“The policy underlying traditional
elective-share statutes . . . is to protect the surviving spouse from disinheritance by the deceased
spouse.”).
107
See Glover, supra note 73, at 423–25 (elaborating on the formal requirements to which
testators must adhere).
108
See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
109
See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
110
See Glover, supra note 3, at 345 (“[T]he rule of strict compliance prohibits courts from
correcting the false-negative outcomes.”).
111
See supra note 98.
112
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 63 (“Distribution of the probate property of . . .
people, who are said to die intestate, is governed by the default rules of the law of intestacy.”).
113
See id. at 70 (describing the basic structure of intestate succession).
114
See id. at 65 (“American intestacy law generally favors the decedent’s spouse, then
descendants, then parents, and then collaterals and more remote kindred.”).
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predecease the decedent. Within this context, the conventional law’s
overproduction of false-negative outcomes can be seen as expressing a
preference for the intestate distribution of the decedent’s property within
the family and therefore as serving a policy of family protection.116
The idea that the law of will-execution favors intestate distribution to
the decedent’s family by impeding the decedent’s exercise of freedom of
disposition undercuts the prevailing understanding of the modern law of
succession. As Professor Adam Hirsch suggests, “[t]he perversity of [this]
analysis is readily apparent,” as it “contradicts the longstanding ideology
of inheritance law, whose central tenet is freedom of testation.”117 If the
law’s central tenet truly is freedom of disposition, then the law should be
designed to facilitate, not hinder, the decedent’s exercise of this
freedom.118 However, the conventional law’s impediment function that
Hirsch finds perverse when viewed through the lens of the modern law
seems less troubling when viewed from a past perspective in which
freedom of disposition held a lesser status.
This diminished status of freedom of disposition is evident in what
Professor James Lindgren describes as the common law’s “presumption
against testacy.”119 This preference for intestate distribution of the
decedent’s estate manifested itself in the way that courts interpreted the
meaning of wills.120 Whereas today courts presume that a decedent would
prefer to avoid intestacy,121 in the past courts presumed that the decedent
intended to benefit intestate heirs unless the decedent unequivocally
expressed the intent to disinherit them.122 For example, one seventeenth115

Id.
See Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1066 n.30 (1996)
(“[A] formalities requirement could reflect another, tacit policy: namely, a preference for the
distributive scheme mandated by the intestacy statute, absent clear and convincing evidence of intent to
the contrary.”).
117
Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous and Contractual Transfers: A Situational Theory, 91
WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 805 (2014).
118
See id. at 805–07 (critiquing Glover’s suggestion that formalities discourage effective will
making).
119
Lindgren, supra note 78, at 552; see also James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L.
REV. 1009, 1029 (1992) (explaining that courts now typically attempt to avoid intestacy).
120
See Lindgren, supra note 78, at 552–53 (elaborating how this view is a reversal of the common
law presumption against testacy).
121
See Adam J. Hirsch, Incomplete Wills, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1423, 1473 (2013) (“Courts have
created a presumption against intestacy . . . .”); see, e.g., In re Carmany’s Estate, 53 A.2d 731, 732–33
(Pa. 1947) (citations omitted) (“One who writes a will is presumed to intend to dispose of all of his
estate and not to die intestate as to any portion thereof. If possible to do so, a will must be construed to
avoid an intestacy.”).
122
See Lindgren, supra note 78, at 552–53 (explaining that the rule protecting heirs has been
displaced by the modern rule of favoring constructions that avoid intestacy); see also 4 JEFFREY A.
SCHOENBLUM, PAGE ON WILLS § 30.16 (2016) (“Every reasonable construction in the will must be
made in favor of the heir at law; and he can be disinherited only by words which produce that effect
clearly and necessarily, either by express terms or by necessary implication.”).
116
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century English court suggested that “the testator’s intent ought not to be
construed to disinherit the heir, in thwarting the dispose which the law
makes of the land, leaving it to descend where the intention of the testator
is not apparently, and not ambiguously to the contrary.”123 Thus, by
presuming that the decedent intended to benefit intestate heirs, the way that
courts interpreted wills once favored distribution of the decedent’s
property within the family.
Similarly, just as a preference for intestate takers once existed within
the context of will interpretation,124 the same preference can also be found
within the context of will authentication. In the past, some courts openly
questioned the appropriateness of granting decedents the ability to pass
property through wills and instead favored distribution of the decedent’s
estate through intestacy.125 For example, the Supreme Court of Georgia
pondered: “Why a desire to favor . . . wills . . . should exist in this State,
we do not very well understand. Ordinarily, our statute of distribution
makes the fairest disposition of a dead man’s property.”126 Likewise, the
Supreme Court of California once suggested that “[i]n the absence of any
will, the law makes a wise, liberal, and beneficent distribution of the dead
man’s estate; so wise, indeed, that the policy of permitting wills at all is
often gravely questioned.”127 These examples suggest that, at some point in
the past, freedom of disposition was not universally heralded as the
cornerstone of the law of succession, and that instead family protection
was viewed as a competing policy objective.
A preference for distribution of property within the family could be
founded upon a number of rationales. For instance, such a preference could
be based on a sense that the decedent has a duty to support dependent
family members after death,128 or relatedly, a preference of intestate
distribution could be seen as promoting the general economic stability of
123
Gardner v. Sheldon (1671) 124 Eng. Rep. 1064, 1066; Vaughan 259, 268 (Eng.); see Thomas
v. Thomas (1796) 101 Eng. Rep. 764, 767; 6 T.R. 671, 677 (Eng.) (“The heirs at law must recover the
possession of this estate, unless some other person be clearly and unequivocally entitled to take under
the will.”).
124
See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
125
See, e.g., Banks v. Sherrod, 52 Ala. 267, 270 (1875) (“The law, and courts of justice, pursuing
its spirit and maxims, have always favored heirs.”); Mann, supra note 74, at 1049 (“[O]ne occasionally
glimpses a belief that intestacy should have a privileged status . . . .”).
126
Reed v. Roberts, 26 Ga. 294, 300–01 (1858).
127
In re Walker’s Estate, 42 P. 815, 818 (Cal. 1895). Similarly, some early nineteenth-century
policymakers expressed their skepticism of broad freedom of disposition by suggesting: “We may
safely lean in favor of intestacy; since it rarely happens that the disposition of a disputed will are as just
and equitable as those which, in the event of it being set aside, the law provides.” Report of Revisers of
N.Y. Statutes of 1827–28, quoted in W.W. Ferrier, Jr., Revival of a Revoked Will, 28 CAL. L. REV. 265,
267 (1940).
128
This is one of the rationales upon which the forced spousal share, which requires the decedent
to leave some portion of her estate to her surviving spouse, is based. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF,
supra note 1, at 514.
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the familial unit. However, regardless of the underlying rationale of a
preference for intestacy, when potential benefits of intrafamilial
distribution of the decedent’s estate are considered alongside freedom of
disposition, probate-error costs become asymmetric.
Specifically, false-negative outcomes become on average less costly
than false-positive outcomes. To be sure, a false-negative outcome
undermines the decedent’s freedom of disposition,130 but the decedent’s
family is protected through intestate distribution of the decedent’s estate.
By contrast, a false-positive outcome also undermines the decedent’s
freedom of disposition;131 however, the inauthentic will could possibly
disinherit the decedent’s family. The conventional law’s preference for
false-negative outcomes and the consequent intestate distribution of the
decedent’s estate could therefore be explained as recognition that family
protectionism is a policy concern within the law of succession that
sometimes competes with the decedent’s freedom of disposition.132
In sum, when the possibility that freedom of disposition once
competed with other policies is recognized, the prospect that probate-error
costs were once asymmetric emerges. Although freedom of disposition is
the cornerstone of the modern law of succession,133 its primacy did not
always go unquestioned, and consequently, policymakers may have
previously viewed false-positive probate errors and false-negative probate
errors as having different costs. In particular, these additional error costs
may have included the extent to which false-positive outcomes present a
risk of familial disinheritance that false-negative outcomes do not.134
Because the law of will-execution developed under conditions in which
protection against familial disinheritance perhaps tempered the decedent’s
freedom of disposition to a greater extent than it does today, the
recognition of alternative probate-error costs places the conventional law
within the appropriate context to better understand its preference for falsenegative outcomes.
B. The Fulfillment of Probable Intent
Sitkoff’s conclusion that the law’s method of authenticating wills
should focus on minimizing the rate of error is founded not only on the
129
See id. at 65 (suggesting that intestate distribution “serves the secondary function of protecting
the economic health of the decedent’s family”); Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing
Families, 18 L. & INEQ. 1, 27 (2000) (explaining that “society has decided that intestacy statutes should
benefit and strengthen families”).
130
Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647.
131
Id.
132
See Glover, supra note 78, at 632–35; see also Glover, supra note 73, at 431–34.
133
See infra Section III.A.
134
See supra notes 111–27 and accompanying text.
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assumption that an error-cost analysis should focus exclusively on the
degree to which the decedent’s freedom of disposition is honored but also
on the assumption that both false-positive outcomes and false-negative
outcomes undermine the decedent’s freedom of disposition to the same
extent.135 As discussed above, inclusion of additional probate-error costs,
such as familial disinheritance, within the error cost analysis could suggest
that a preference for false-negative outcomes is justified.136 However, the
exclusion of family protection from probate-error cost analysis does not
inevitably render error costs symmetric, and therefore it does not
necessarily suggest that the law’s method of will-authentication should
focus exclusively on accuracy. Even if the analysis focuses solely on the
extent to which the law honors the decedent’s freedom of disposition,
asymmetric probate-error costs could still explain the conventional law’s
preference for false-negative outcomes.
To evaluate the soundness of Sitkoff’s second assumption, one must
therefore understand how the decedent’s property is distributed both when
a false-positive outcome occurs and when a false-negative outcome occurs.
When the law produces a false-positive outcome, the decedent’s property
is distributed according to the terms of a will that the decedent did not
intend to constitute a legally effective expression of her desired estate
plan.137 As such, the costs of a false-positive outcome depend upon the
likelihood that the terms of an inauthentic will significantly depart from the
decedent’s intended estate plan. By contrast, when the law produces a
false-negative outcome and the decedent dies without a legally effective
will, the decedent’s estate is distributed according to the default estate plan
of intestacy.138 The costs associated with a false-negative outcome
consequently depend upon the extent to which the default estate plan of
intestacy carries out the decedent’s intent.
The important takeaway from both of these scenarios is that neither
type of probate error necessarily results in an entirely unintended
disposition of property. Instead, the extent to which a probate error
undermines the decedent’s freedom of disposition is a matter of degree. A
probate-error cost analysis that focuses on freedom of disposition must
therefore compare the likely extent to which an inauthentic will reflects the
decedent’s intended estate plan and the likely extent to which the default
estate plan of intestacy matches the decedent’s intent. If inauthentic wills
generally do a better job of carrying out the decedent’s intended estate plan
than the default estate plan of intestacy, then false-positive outcomes are
135

Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647.
See supra Section II.A.
137
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 63 (explaining the default rules of the law of
intestacy).
138
Id.; see also supra note 98.
136
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on average less costly than false-negative outcomes. Conversely, if the
default estate plan of intestacy typically honors the decedent’s intent to a
greater extent than inauthentic wills, then false-negative outcomes are
generally less costly than false-positive outcomes. If, as Sitkoff suggests,139
false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes on average fulfill the
decedent’s intent to the same degree, then both types of error are equally
costly.
A false-positive outcome could occur if the decedent left behind a
rough draft of a document that purports to dispose of the decedent’s estate
but that the decedent did not intend to be a legally effective will or when a
wrongdoer attempts to benefit from the decedent’s estate through fraud or
duress.140 As suggested previously, when a false-positive outcome occurs,
the decedent’s estate is not inevitably distributed only to unintended
beneficiaries. Indeed, even an inauthentic will could accurately express the
decedent’s intended estate plan to some degree. For instance, when the
decedent leaves behind a rough draft of a will to which she has not given
her final assent, she could be certain of some dispositions of property but
not all aspects of her estate plan.141 Because the inauthentic will accurately
reflects some of her intended gifts, a false-positive outcome in this
situation would not completely undermine her freedom of disposition. A
rough draft of a will that the decedent did not intend to be a final
expression of her estate plan will not always partially reflect her intended
testamentary gifts, and certainly, an inauthentic will might not accurately
reflect her final intent at all. However, for purposes of error-cost analysis,
it is important to note that a rough draft could, to a certain extent,
accurately describe the decedent’s intended estate plan. Therefore, a false139

Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647; see also supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
Under the conventional law of will execution, false-positive outcomes resulting from the
court’s validation of rough drafts are rare. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153 (“A
competent person not subject to undue influence, duress, or fraud is unlikely to execute an instrument
in strict compliance with all the Wills Act formalities unless the person intends the instrument to be his
will.”); Guzman, supra note 5, at 311 n.18 (“Few people would undergo [the will-execution] ceremony
without holding testamentary intent.”). However, situations do occur in which the decedent leaves
behind a formally compliant will that she does not intend to be legally effective. See Glover, supra note
3, at 363–66 (explaining that a contestant of the will can show evidence to argue that the decedent did
not intend the will to be legally effective). Fraud in this context involves a wrongdoer attempting to
probate a will that the decedent did not intend to be legally effective. See Glover, supra note 78, at 618
(discussing the protection against fraud during the execution of the will and at the time of probate).
Similarly, duress in the context of will authentication involves a wrongdoer coercing the decedent to
execute a will that she does not intend to be legally effective. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“A donative transfer is
procured by duress if the wrongdoer threatened to perform or did perform a wrongful act that coerced
the donor into making a donative transfer that the donor would not otherwise have made.”).
141
See Sherwin, supra note 14, at 463–64 n.49 (“[A]n informal document offered as a will often
reflects a disposition that the testator at least considered, even if the disposition was ultimately
rejected.”).
140
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positive outcome will not always undermine the decedent’s freedom of
disposition.
By contrast, when false-positive outcomes occur because of fraud or
duress,142 the possibility that an inauthentic will accurately reflects the
decedent’s intended estate plan becomes substantially less likely. In such
situations, the will is inauthentic not because it is a work-in-progress to
which the decedent has not given her final assent, but instead because a
wrongdoer has attempted to benefit from the decedent’s estate. In a
situation involving fraud, the terms of the will likely do not substantially
conform with the decedent’s intent and may not reflect her intended
testamentary gifts at all because the wrongdoers would not have attempted
fraud or duress if they would benefit from the decedent’s intended estate
plan. Thus, when a false-positive outcome occurs because of the lack of the
decedent’s final approval, error costs could be insignificant, but when a
false-positive outcome occurs because of fraud or duress, error costs are
likely substantial.
In contrast to a false-positive outcome, a false-negative outcome could
occur when the decedent intends the will to be legally effective but fails to
leave behind strong evidence that she intended the will to be legally
effective.143 To be sure, in such situations, the best evidence of the
decedent’s intended testamentary dispositions is ignored.144 However, just
because the decedent tried to leave behind a legally effective expression of
her intent does not mean that her intended estate plan significantly departs
from the default estate plan of intestacy. A large portion of her intended
testamentary gifts could be fulfilled regardless of whether her estate is
distributed according to the terms of her will or in the manner laid out in
the intestacy statute. To analyze the error costs associated with a falsenegative outcome, one must therefore understand how the default estate
plan of intestacy disposes of the decedent’s estate and what goals
policymakers attempt to achieve when crafting intestacy statutes.
The primary goal of an intestacy statute is to distribute the decedent’s
142

See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
Under conventional law, the decedent must leave behind a formally compliant will, a
requirement that creates a substantial risk of false-negative outcomes. See supra notes 72–77 and
accompanying text.
144
See Matter of Estate of Lohr, 497 N.W.2d 730, 735 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (“[T]he language of
the will is the best evidence of the testator’s intent . . . .”). The language of an authentic will is typically
considered such reliable evidence of the decedent’s substantive donative intent that courts generally
will not look to other evidence of the decedent’s intended estate plan. See Mark Glover, A Taxonomy of
Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 569, 595–96 (2016) (explaining the obstacles that may
be present when a court tries to ascertain the actual intent of a decedent). Of course, testimony from the
testator herself would be better evidence of her intent, but such evidence in unavailable at the time of
probate. See Aloysius A. Leopold & Gerry W. Beyer, Ante-Mortem Probate: A Viable Alternative, 43
ARK. L. REV. 131, 137 (1990) (explaining that the current system cannot guarantee that a testator’s
intentions and instructions will be followed, despite his caution and efforts).
143
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property in the way that she likely would have intended had she left behind
a legally effective will.145 As Sitkoff explains, “[i]n accordance with the
principle of freedom of disposition, the primary objective in designing an
intestacy statute is to carry out the probable intent of the typical intestate
decedent—that is, to provide majoritarian default rules for property
succession at death.”146 The task of designing this majoritarian default rule
of course involves “substantial guesswork,”147 but such guesswork may not
have been so difficult in the past when the conventional law of will
execution developed.
Without exception, policymakers have crafted intestacy statutes so that
the decedent’s property is distributed within the family, 148 with close
family members, such as spouses and children, taking first and more
remote relatives taking in their absence.149 Intuitively, distribution within
the family would seem to be what most decedents would prefer,150 and
indeed, despite the broad freedom of disposition that decedents enjoy,
several studies of probate records suggest that, in the past, most people
who executed wills distributed the bulk of their estates to close family
members in consistent and predictable ways.151
Of course, just because most decedents intend to benefit family
members and intestacy accomplishes this goal does not mean that the costs
145
See Susan N. Gary, The Probate Definition of Family: A Proposal for Guided Discretion in
Intestacy, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 787, 789 (2012) (“The primary goal of intestacy statutes, as stated
by the drafters of the UPC and by scholars, is to transfer property according to the probable intent of a
decedent who dies without a will. The statutes try to reach the result that most intestate decedents likely
would want . . . .”); Reid Kress Weisbord, Anatomical Intent, YALE L.J. FORUM 117, 125 (2014) (“For
the most part, intestacy law operates by ascertaining and employing commonly held preferences as a
proxy for the probable intent of intestate decedents.”).
146
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 63.
147
See id. (explaining further that the disparate preferences of persons without a will must be
aggregated into a model intestate decedent).
148
See id. at 70 (explaining the basic structure of intestate succession).
149
See id. at 65 (“American intestacy law generally favors the decedent’s spouse, then
descendants, then parents, and then collaterals and more remote kindred.”).
150
See CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 207 (1987) (“Despite almost complete testamentary freedom, Americans have whenever
possible limited their substantial bequests to spouse, sons, and daughters.”); STEWART E. STERK ET AL.,
ESTATES AND TRUSTS CASES AND MATERIALS 167 (4th ed. 2011) (“Most people who write wills leave
the bulk of their property to close family members, and particularly to spouses. [T]hey generally need
no legal compulsion to provide for family members.”).
151
See, e.g., Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at
Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 254 (1962) (reporting that a study of the probate records of Cook
County, Illinois, for the years 1953 and 1957, shows that most testators left their estates to a surviving
spouse or, if no surviving spouse, to surviving descendants); Kristine S. Knaplund, The Evolution of
Women’s Rights in Inheritance, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 21–30 (2008) (reporting in a study of
probate records of Los Angeles County from 1893 that most testators left the bulk of their estates to
family); Edward H. Ward & J. H. Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 WIS. L. REV.
393, 413 (reporting that in a study of Wisconsin probate proceedings from the 1930s and 1940s that
“practically all testators transferred their property ‘within the family’”).
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of a false-negative outcome are necessarily insignificant. If the decedent
intends to benefit family members in a way that does not conform to the
dispositive scheme that the intestacy statute prescribes, error costs of falsenegative outcomes could be substantial. This could especially be true under
modern conditions in which familial structures vary significantly due to the
increase of unmarried cohabitation, nonmarital children, and blended
families.152 However, in the past, the default estate plan of intestacy may
have largely conformed with most decedents’ intended estate plans
because most families had similar structures, with the traditional nuclear
family comprised of a husband, a wife, and their children.153 Therefore,
when the conventional law of will execution developed, false-negative
outcomes likely had relatively low average error costs because the default
estate plan of intestacy substantially aligned with the intended estate plans
of most decedents.
Like false-positive outcomes, false-negative outcomes can occur with
or without fraud. A false-positive outcome that occurs as the result of fraud
involves a wrongdoer attempting to pass a will that the decedent did not
intend to be legally effective through the probate process.154 By contrast, a
false-negative outcome that is produced by fraud involves the fraudulent
suppression of an authentic will.155 More specifically, in this scenario the
wrongdoer argues during the probate process that a purported will is
inauthentic when, in fact, the wrongdoer knows that it is authentic. Despite
the similarities between false-positive outcomes and false-negative
outcomes that are the product of fraud, the two scenarios on average
produce different error costs. Whereas a false-positive outcome that occurs
as a result of wrongdoing likely has substantial error costs,156 a falsenegative outcome might not. When a false-positive outcome occurs, the
wrongdoer specifies the gifts that are made through the terms of the
fraudulent will, and therefore the wrongdoer has wide latitude to describe
an estate plan that significantly departs from the decedent’s intended estate
152

See infra Section III.B.
See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised
Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 683, 685–87 (1992) (“The transformation of the
American family constitutes one of the great phenomenons of the past two decades. The traditional
Leave It to Beaver family no longer prevails in American society. To be sure, families consisting of the
wage-earning husband, the homemaking and child-rearing wife, and their two joint children still exist.
But divorce rates are astonishingly high and remarriage abounds. . . . In addition, single parent families
and families with two working adults are commonplace. Lesbian, gay, and unmarried heterosexual
couples, sometimes with children, constitute unmistakable parts of the American family scene.
Inevitably, this transformation of the family will increasingly exert new tensions on traditional wealthsuccession laws . . . .”).
154
See supra note 140.
155
See Glover, supra note 78, at 618 (noting that fraud during a will execution can include
instances of suppression of a valid will).
156
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
153
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plan. However, when a false-negative outcome occurs through fraud, the
wrongdoer has substantially less leeway to manipulate the decedent’s
estate plan because the gifts that replace those intended by the decedent are
limited to the default plan of estate plan of intestacy, a limitation that
minimizes likely error costs.157
Thus, a comparison of the likelihood of unintended disposition of
property under both false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes
suggests that false-positive outcomes typically have greater error costs than
false-negative outcomes. At least under previous conditions in which
families were more uniformly structured,158 false-negative outcomes that
did not involve fraud likely undermined the decedent’s freedom of
disposition to a lesser extent than false-positive outcomes that did not
involve fraud.159 Indeed, because most decedents intended to leave
property to close family members and this result was achieved through the
default plan of intestacy,160 false-negative outcomes might have had lower
error costs than false-positive outcomes. Furthermore, the difference in
error costs between false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes is
likely greater in situations involving fraud. Because the wrongdoer who
attempts to pass a fraudulent will through the probate process dictates the
terms of the inauthentic will but the wrongdoer who suppresses an
authentic will cannot, false-positive outcomes involving fraud likely have
higher error costs than false-negative outcomes resulting from fraud. Of
course, the evaluation of the typical costs of probate errors is not precise;
however, it is plausible that under previous conditions error costs focusing
solely on the decedent’s freedom of disposition were asymmetric, and
therefore the conventional law’s preference for false-negative outcomes
may have been justified.
All in all, Sitkoff’s conclusion that probate-error costs are symmetric is
based upon two assumptions. First, he assumes that the only error cost that
should be considered is the extent to which the decedent’s freedom of
disposition is undermined,161 and second, he assumes that the decedent’s
intent is undermined to the same extent if her estate is distributed
according to the terms of an inauthentic will or if an authentic will is
ignored and her estate is distributed according to the default estate plan of
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See supra notes 145–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
159
See Sherwin, supra note 14, at 463 n.49 (“Because [intestacy] statutes are designed to mimic
the intentions of typical testators, an error resulting in intestacy might, on average, be less at odds with
the testator’s wishes than an error resulting in probate of an informal disposition the testator did not
intend to take effect.”).
160
See supra notes 145–53 and accompanying text.
161
See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647 (stating that error in will execution “dishonor[s] the
decedent’s freedom of disposition.”); see also supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
158
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162

intestacy. However, these assumptions may not be appropriate when the
process of will-authentication is considered from the perspective of
policymakers during the time that the conventional law developed.
If other policy considerations previously competed with the decedent’s
freedom of disposition, then probate-error costs may once have been
asymmetric.163 Likewise, if, in the past, the default estate plan of intestacy
substantially conformed to most decedents’ intended estate plans, then the
average cost of a false-negative outcome may have been significantly less
than the cost of a false-positive outcome, thereby also resulting in
asymmetric probate-error costs.164 Therefore, if at one time there were
other costs associated with probate errors other than unintended
dispositions of property or if the default estate plan of intestacy
substantially mirrored the intended estate plans of most decedents, the
conventional law’s preference for false-negative outcomes may have
previously represented an optimal tradeoff between the two types of
probate errors.
III. SYMMETRIC PROBATE-ERROR COSTS
Although probate-error costs may once have been asymmetric,165 the
reform movement’s supposition that probate-error costs are now symmetric
may be correct if conditions have changed since the time that the
conventional method for authenticating wills developed. If, as Sitkoff
suggests, the only error cost that should be considered is the extent to
which the decedent’s freedom of disposition is undermined and if both
false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes undermine the
decedent’s freedom of disposition to the same degree, then probate-error
costs are now symmetric.166
This Section argues that, under current conditions, probate-error costs
are now more symmetric than they once were. Specifically, this Section
explains that freedom of disposition is now unquestionably the cornerstone
of the law of succession and therefore validates Sitkoff’s assumption that
other error costs should not be considered when analyzing the law’s
method for authenticating wills.167 Furthermore, it argues that, although the
default estate plan of intestacy may once have largely fulfilled most
162
See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647 (holding that that the admission of inauthentic wills and the
denial of authentic wills are equally erroneous and must be “balanced”); see also supra notes 96–98
and accompanying text.
163
See supra Section II.A.
164
See supra notes 140–57 and accompanying text.
165
See supra Section II.
166
See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647 (stating that admission of inauthentic wills and the denial of
authentic wills need to be “balanced” against each other); see also supra notes 93–98 and
accompanying text.
167
See infra Section III.A.
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decedents’ intent, intestacy statutes are no longer as reliable as they once
were, and therefore false-negative outcomes likely no longer have smaller
average error costs than false-positive outcomes.169 Because this Section
argues that probate-error costs now exhibit greater symmetry, it bolsters
the reform movement’s argument that the conventional law should be
altered so that the process for authenticating wills becomes more
accurate.170
A. The Primacy of Freedom of Disposition
Sitkoff’s suggestion that unintended dispositions of property are the
only probate-error costs that should be considered is correct. This focus on
the extent to which the decedent’s freedom of disposition is undermined
stems from the central role that freedom of disposition plays in the modern
law of wills, which is evident in numerous descriptions of the law by
jurists, scholars, and policymakers. As Hirsch explains: “[C]ourts
traditionally exalt freedom of testation and the fulfillment of testamentary
intent as central to gratuitous transfers policy.”171 The Supreme Court of
Washington exemplifies Hirsch’s understanding when it places freedom of
disposition at the forefront of the law of wills thusly: “A basic principle
underlying any discussion of the law of wills is that an individual has the
right and the freedom to dispose of his or her property, upon death,
according to the dictates of his or her own desires.”172 Likewise, echoing
their jurist counterparts, legal scholars have repeatedly described the
decedent’s freedom of disposition as having an elevated status within the
modern law of wills.173 Sitkoff, for example, explains that the “American
law of succession embraces freedom of disposition, authorizing dead hand
control, to an extent that is unique among modern legal systems.”174
168

See supra Section II.B.
See infra Section III.B.
170
See supra Section I.B.
171
Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 632 (1989); see,
e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 895 (Ill. 2009) (“The public policy of the state of Illinois
as expressed in the Probate Act is, thus, one of broad testamentary freedom . . . .”); Cantrell v. Cantrell,
No. M2002-02883-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 3044907, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2004) (“A
fundamental principle of the law of wills is that a testator is entitled to dispose of the testator’s property
as he or she sees fit, regardless of any perceived injustice that may result from such a choice.”).
172
In re Estate of Malloy, 949 P.2d 804, 806 (Wash. 1998).
173
See, e.g., THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 349 (5th ed. 2011) (“Freedom of disposition is the hallmark of the
American law of succession.”); Mark Glover, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate
Planning, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 444–45 (2012) (“Testamentary freedom is so fundamental that it
has consistently been heralded as the keystone of the law of succession.”); Langbein, supra note 11, at
491 (“The first principle of the law of wills is freedom of testation.”); Spitko, supra note 102, at 278
(“The ideal of testamentary freedom grounds the law of testation.”).
174
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 1.
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Perhaps the clearest explanation of the primary role that freedom of
disposition plays within the law of wills is found in the Restatement
(Third) of Property. The Restatement explains: “The organizing principle
of the American law of donative transfers is freedom of disposition.
Property owners have the nearly unrestricted right to dispose of their
property as they please.”175 Although the Restatement recognizes that the
decedent’s freedom of disposition is not absolute,176 it suggests that the
law’s primary focus should be freedom of disposition.177 It explains
further, “[t]he main function of the law in this field is to facilitate rather
than regulate. The law serves this function by establishing rules under
which sufficiently reliable determinations can be made regarding the
content of the donor’s intention.”178 Therefore, as the Restatement makes
clear, the modern law of wills is founded upon freedom of disposition, and
subject to limited exceptions, the purpose of the entirety of the law in this
area is to facilitate the decedent’s exercise of this freedom.
The recognition of the primacy of freedom of disposition within the
modern law of succession changes the error-cost analysis related to the
authentication of wills. In the past, familial disinheritance may have
increased the error costs of false-positive outcomes, thereby making
probate-error costs asymmetric.179 Both false-positive outcomes and falsenegative outcomes produce unintended dispositions of property.180
However, unlike false-negative outcomes, which result in the decedent’s
estate passing to family members through intestacy,181 false-positive
outcomes raise the possibility that the decedent’s family will be

175
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 2003).
176
See id. § 10.1 cmt. c (“American law curtails freedom of disposition only to the extent that the
donor attempts to make a disposition or achieve a purpose that is prohibited or restricted by an
overriding rule of law. . . . Among the rules of law that prohibit or restrict freedom of disposition in
certain instances are those relating to spousal rights; creditors’ rights; unreasonable restraints on
alienation or marriage; provisions promoting separation or divorce; impermissible racial or other
categoric restrictions; provisions encouraging illegal activity; and the rules against perpetuities and
accumulations.”); see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing the ways in which
freedom of disposition is curtailed by statutory limitations).
177
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 10.1 cmt. a (“This section implements this fundamental
principle by stating two well-accepted propositions: (1) that the controlling consideration in
determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention; and (2) that the donor’s
intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.”).
178
Id. § 10.1 cmt. c; see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 1 (“Most of the law of
succession is concerned with enabling posthumous enforcement of the actual intent of the decedent or,
failing this, giving effect to the decedent’s probable intent.”).
179
See supra Section II.A.
180
See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647 (stating that “[probating an inauthentic will] gives effect to a
false expression of testamentary intent” and “[denying probate to an authentic will] denies effect to a
true expression of testamentary intent”).
181
See supra notes 111–16 and accompanying text.
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disinherited. If policymakers in the past viewed familial disinheritance
as an error cost that should be considered when authenticating wills, they
may have favored false-negative outcomes because the default estate plan
of intestacy ensured that the decedent’s estate would be distributed
amongst her family.183
The inclusion of familial disinheritance within the error-cost analysis,
however, conflicts with the modern law’s focus on freedom of
disposition.184 As the Restatement explains, the law should facilitate the
exercise of freedom of disposition by attempting to carry out the
decedent’s intended estate plan.185 Because a family protection policy is
not concerned with the intent of the decedent, the inclusion of familial
disinheritance within the probate-error cost analysis undermines the
facilitative goal of the law and also decreases the accuracy of will
authentication. Thus, given freedom of disposition’s elevated status
today,186 family protection should not factor significantly into the modern
law’s relative error-cost analysis.187 In turn, the removal of error costs that
are not related to freedom of disposition or the decedent’s intent increases
the likelihood that, on average, the error costs that are included in the
analysis are symmetric because the error costs of false-positive outcomes
are no longer increased by the potential of family disinheritance.
This shift toward symmetric error costs that results from the focus on
freedom of disposition is evident in modern trends regarding how the law
authenticates wills. As Hirsch explains, a probate-error cost analysis that
considers family protectionism is inconsistent with “the modern statutory
trend in favor of rolling back testamentary formalities that appear
superfluous” because, if false-positive outcomes were considered more
costly than false-negative outcomes, “superfluity should comprise a virtue,
and the formalities of execution should remain thick and robust.”188 Put
differently, if false-positive outcomes were worse than false-negative
outcomes, then high levels of formality should remain in place so that the

182

See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
Supra Section II.A.
184
See Hirsch, supra note 117, at 805 (noting the “longstanding ideology of inheritance law,
whose central tenant is freedom of testation”).
185
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmts.
a, c (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
186
See supra notes 171–78 and accompanying text.
187
See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text. That is not to say that a family protection goal
should be absent from the law of succession, but instead that if the law pursues such a goal, it should be
made explicit and not imbedded in the way that the law authenticates wills.
188
Hirsch, supra 117, at 806; see Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 243 (1996) (“The argument for simplifying will formalities and forgiving ‘harmless
errors’ in execution rests on the premise that effectuating testamentary intent, and thus protecting
testamentary freedom, is the primary goal of wills law.”).
183
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risk of false-positive outcomes is minimized. However, because the goal
of reform is not to protect against false-positive outcomes but is instead to
increase the accuracy of will authentication, the trend of reduced formality
that Hirsch describes is consistent with the view that probate-error costs
are symmetric.190
In sum, as both Sitkoff and Hirsch suggest,191 the extent to which the
decedent’s freedom of disposition is undermined is the only error cost that
should be considered when analyzing the method by which courts
authenticate wills. Although, other policies, such as family protection, may
have once influenced how the law developed,192 freedom of disposition is
now unquestionably the organizing principle of the law of wills.193 As
such, the only error costs that should be considered when authenticating
wills are unintended dispositions of property; other error costs, such as
familial disinheritance, should be ignored. When error costs other than
unintended dispositions of property are discarded from the error-cost
analysis, probate errors become more symmetric, which consequently
bolsters the reform movement’s argument that the law’s goal should be
increased accuracy in differentiating authentic wills from inauthentic
wills.194
B. The Shortcomings of Intestacy
Sitkoff’s conclusion that probate-error costs are symmetric and
therefore that the goal of the law’s method for authenticating wills should
be accuracy is based not only on the assumption that unintended
dispositions of property are the only error costs that should be considered
but also on the assumption that false-positive outcomes and false-negative
outcomes undermine the decedent’s freedom of disposition to the same
extent.195 Like his first assumption,196 Sitkoff’s second assumption may
have been incorrect in the past, but it is now more likely accurate under
modern conditions. As a result, probate-error costs are now more likely
symmetric than they once were.
189

See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
191
See Hirsch, supra note 117, at 805–06 (focusing on the “central tenet . . . [of] freedom of
testation”); Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647 (suggesting a “decedent’s freedom of disposition” should be
considered).
192
Supra Section II.A.
193
Supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. Several potential rationales may underlie the
primacy of freedom of dispositions. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 16–19 (outlining
rationales such as support of a market for social services and efficient distribution of wealth).
194
Supra Section I.B.
195
See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647 (describing that one error gives effect to a false expression of
testamentary intent and that the latter error denies effect to a true expression of testamentary intent); see
also supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
196
Supra Section III.A.
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As explained previously, the extent to which probate errors undermine
the decedent’s freedom of disposition by producing unintended
dispositions of property depends upon how the decedent’s estate is
distributed both when a false-positive outcome occurs and when a falsenegative outcome occurs.197 When a false-positive outcome occurs, the
decedent’s estate is distributed according to the terms of a will that she did
not intend to be legally effective.198 In such a situation, the potential error
costs are high because wills can distribute property to any and all potential
beneficiaries.199 By contrast, when a false-negative outcome occurs and the
decedent dies without a legally effective will, her estate is distributed
according to the default estate plan of intestacy.200 As such, the average
error costs associated with a false-negative outcome depend upon the
extent to which the default estate plan aligns with the decedent’s intended
estate plan. If intestacy substantially conforms to most decedents’ intent,
error costs are low, but if intestacy does a poor job of approximating most
decedents’ intended estate plan, error costs are high.
In the past, error costs stemming from false-negative outcomes were
likely to be relatively low because most decedents intended to benefit close
family members after death in a fairly predictable manner,201 and the
default estate plan of intestacy achieved this result.202 In contrast, the error
costs of false-positive outcomes were correspondingly high because most
decedents intended to benefit their family but inauthentic wills could
dispose of property outside the decedent’s family. 203 Consequently,
probate-error costs were likely asymmetric during the time that the
conventional law of will authentication developed.204 Under today’s
conditions, however, the default estate plan of intestacy no longer
approximates the intended estate plan of most decedents to the same extent
197

See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 63 (positing that distributing the decedent’s
estate “often involves substantial guesswork” because of “the disparate preferences of persons without
a will”).
199
See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
200
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 63; see also supra note 98 (explaining that when
the will is invalidated, the decedent’s estate is distributed in accordance with the default estate plan of
intestacy).
201
See STERK ET AL., supra note 150, at 65 (“Studies indicate that most people—both those who
write wills and those who do not––prefer to have their property pass to close family members . . . .”);
see also supra notes 150–151 and accompanying text.
202
See King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85, 87–88 (W. Va. 1983) (“The purpose of [intestacy] statutes .
. . is to provide a distribution of real and personal property that approximates what decedents would
have done if they had made a will. Spouses and children enjoy a favored position under the laws of
intestate succession because, on statistical average, they are the natural objects of most peoples’
bounty.”); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 65, 70; see also supra notes 148–49 and
accompanying text.
203
See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
204
See supra Section II.B.
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as it once did, and therefore, the error costs associated with false-negative
outcomes are now greater than they once were.
The task of crafting intestacy statutes that match the typical decedent’s
intent has always involved considerable guesswork,205 but given the
increasing variation in familial structure,206 this task is more difficult than
ever. As Sitkoff explains, “[e]volving social norms have made [crafting
intestacy statutes] increasingly difficult, as family and family-like
relationships have become more varied and complex. Multiple marriages,
same-sex marriages, blended families, adoption, and unmarried
cohabitation have become increasingly common. Medical science now
offers the making of a baby without coitus.”207 This increased variation in
familial structures has, as Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explains, “[made]
it difficult to speak of an average American family.”208 As it has become
more difficult to identify an average family, it has become correspondingly
more difficult to determine how a typical decedent would want her
property distributed upon death.209
This difficulty in identifying the probable intent of the typical decedent
is evident in an empirical study of recent probate records. Although studies
of historical probate records confirm that the vast majority of decedents
once preferred to distribute property to close family members,210 the
findings of Professor David Horton contradict this conventional

205

See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 63.
GALLANIS, supra note 173, at 59; see Nancy E. Dowd, Law, Culture, and Family: The
Transformative Power of Culture and the Limits of Law, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 785, 789 (2003)
(“[T]he fluidity of family forms contrasts with static legal definitions that presume stability. Although
our dominant legal norm is that family is a heterosexual, marital, biological unit, our social and cultural
patterns expose a culture that is largely at odds with that nuclear, marital family norm.”) (internal
citations omitted).
207
Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 645; see STERK ET AL., supra note 150, at 107 (“For many people in
today’s America, the family is not a simple entity composed of parents married for life and children
born within the marital relationship. Instead, family may be a complex web of relationships affected by
divorce, remarriage, adoption, and non-marital relationships.”).
208
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (“The composition of families varies greatly from
household to household.”); see Katherine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families:
The Standardization of Family Law When There Is No Standard Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 319,
322–26 (describing the changes in society that have led to the destandardization of family).
209
See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 646 (“In light of evolving family and family-like relationships, to
track the probable intent of the typical intestate decedent, the law of intestacy must likewise evolve.
But on some issues, there is no clear majoritarian preference or preferences may be in flux.”); see also
STERK ET AL., supra note 150, at 107 (“The changing face of the American family has had a significant
impact on intestate succession law . . . .”); Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing
Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 57 (2000) (“The difficulty of creating a scheme of intestate distribution in
the face of the multitude of family combinations cannot be underestimated . . . .”).
210
See supra note 151 and accompanying text (citing studies that showed the majority of wills
distributed the estates to close family members).
206

650

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:613

211

understanding. Horton reviewed the Alameda County, California probate
records of decedents who died in 2007, a data set consisting of 668
estates.212 The study revealed “a surge in ‘nontraditional’ dispositive
choices” that “sweeps within its ambit a diverse group of people with often
antagonistic interests.”213 More specifically, Horton points out that whereas
the previous studies of historical probate records seldom produced
examples of nontraditional estate plans, his study revealed that a large
portion of decedents prefer idiosyncratic dispositive schemes. Horton
explains, “as drafted, 176 of the Alameda County wills (44%) deviated
from the norm of ‘equally near, equally dear.’ These testators gave nothing
to close family members, or favored some children over others, or
rewarded friends, far-flung relatives, in-laws, stepchildren, or charities.”214
Thus, Horton’s study suggests that modern decedents are less likely than
previous generations to prefer a traditional estate plan that benefits close
family members in a consistent and predictable way.
The increased variation in nontraditional family structures and the
corresponding decrease in predictable preferences for intrafamily
distribution of wealth have increased the error costs associated with falsenegative outcomes. No longer are false-negative outcomes backstopped by
a default estate plan that substantially conforms with the intended estate
plans of the vast majority of decedents. As such, when the court invalidates
an authentic will and the decedent dies intestate, the costs produced are on
average greater than they were when the preferences of most decedents
largely aligned with the default estate plan of intestacy. These increased
costs associated with false-negative outcomes have evened out the relative
error costs of all probate errors. Under current conditions, a false-positive
outcome can result in distributions of property that completely deviate
from the decedent’s intended estate plan.215 Likewise, because the
overwhelming majority of decedents no longer have easily predictable
preferences that can be incorporated into the default estate plan of
intestacy,216 a false-negative outcome more likely results in distributions of
property that completely deviate from the decedent’s intent. Consequently,
the error costs associated with both false-positive outcomes and falsenegative outcomes are more symmetric than they once were.
In sum, whereas false-negative outcomes may once have been less
costly than false-positive outcomes because the default estate plan of
211
See David Horton, In Partial Defense of Probate: Evidence from Alameda County, California,
103 GEO. L.J. 605, 630–33 (2015) (“[P]robate is no longer a family matter.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
212
See id. at 626–27 (describing the parameters of his study).
213
Id. at 630.
214
Id.
215
See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
216
See supra notes 206–14 and accompanying text.
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intestacy substantially conformed with the probable intent of most
decedents,217 probate-error costs are now likely more symmetric. The
increase in non-traditional family structures has made the task of predicting
the probable intent of most decedents significantly more difficult.218 Thus,
false-negative outcomes are no longer backstopped by a default estate plan
that substantially mitigates the error costs produced by such probate errors.
As the error costs associated with false-negative outcomes increase, they
more closely resemble the error costs associated with false-positive
outcomes. The diversification of decedents’ intended estate plans has
increased the symmetry between the error costs associated with falsepositive outcomes and false-negative outcomes and consequently supports
the reform movement’s argument that the law’s method of will
authentication should be made more accurate.
C. The Backstop of Testation
Throughout this Article, it has been assumed that when a falsenegative outcome occurs because an authentic will is incorrectly denied
probate, the decedent’s property will be distributed according to the default
estate plan of intestacy.219 This assumption facilitates the analysis of
relative probate-error costs by demarking a clear distinction between the
consequences of false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes.220
Nevertheless, this assumption does not accurately reflect the consequences
of false-negative outcomes under all circumstances. Sometimes a decedent
attempts to execute only one will in her lifetime, and in such situations a
false-negative outcome results in intestacy because the decedent’s sole will
is denied probate. Other times, however, a decedent leaves behind a
sequence of wills that reflects changes in her intended estate plan over the
course of her life.221 In such situations, the decedent’s last legally effective
will governs the distribution of her property.222 Thus, when a decedent
leaves behind multiple wills, a false-negative outcome results in the
distribution of the decedent’s estate not through intestacy but instead
according to the terms of her last legally effective will.
The recognition that not all false-negative outcomes lead to intestate
217

Supra Section II.B.
Supra notes 206–14 and accompanying text.
219
See supra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining the consequences of having no valid
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will).
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See text accompanying notes 197–200.
See, e.g., In re Hamm’s Estate, 227 N.W.2d 34, 44 (Wis. 1975) (involving a testator who
executes two wills in 1965, one in 1966, and an additional will in 1970); see Krausz v. Garver, No. 978-31, 1979 WL 207991, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1979) (explaining that most people create many
wills during their lifetime and proposing a hypothetical situation in which a testatrix executes her first
will in 1930 and her twenty-fifth will in 1978).
222
See Green v. Higdon, 870 S.W.2d 513, 520 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (“[T]he last valid will of
deceased controls the disposition of . . . property . . . .”).
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distribution of the decedent’s estate raises issues regarding the relationship
between the error costs of false-negative outcomes and false-positive
outcomes. The potentially high error costs associated with false-positive
outcomes remain the same;223 however, the error costs associated with
false-negative outcomes could change, but not necessarily. The primary
consideration in analyzing the error costs of false-negative outcomes that
result in the distribution of the decedent’s estate according to the terms of a
previously executed will is that the decedent did not intend the prior will to
be legally effective. Indeed, because the decedent attempted to execute a
new will, she consequently did not intend her old will to govern the
distribution of her estate. The issue then becomes how accurately the
decedent’s outdated will describes her intended estate plan.
On the one hand, the error costs of false-negative outcomes could
remain high because the mere fact that the decedent intended to replace her
preexisting will could suggest that the prior will no longer reflects her
intended estate plan at all. If the decedent completely changes the
dispositive provisions of her will, then the incorrect invalidation of her new
will and the consequent distribution of her estate according to an outdated
will could entirely undermine her freedom of disposition and therefore
could produce significant error costs. Under this scenario, both falsepositive outcomes and false-negative outcomes produce potentially high
error costs because both result in the distribution of the decedent’s property
according to a will that the decedent did not intend to be legally effective
and that does not reflect her intended estate plan. Consequently, the
symmetry between false-positive error costs and false-negative error costs
that exists when false-negative outcomes result in intestate distribution
would also hold when false-negative outcomes result in the distribution of
the decedent’s property according to the terms of an outdated will.
On the other hand, the potential error costs of false-negative outcomes
would decrease if the will that the decedent intended to amend at least
partially reflects the decedent’s intended estate plan. Although the
decedent’s attempt to replace her preexisting will could suggest that she
intended to make wholesale changes to her estate plan, the execution of a
new will does not necessarily result in drastic alterations to the manner in
which property is distributed. In fact, instead of replacing an old will to
make significant dispositive changes, the decedent could execute a new
will that makes no changes to her estate plan but that simply corrects
typographical errors within the document.224 In this situation, a false-

223

See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., La Croix v. Senecal, 99 A.2d 115, 116 (Conn. 1953) (involving a testator who
executed a codicil to her will that did not change the dispositive scheme but instead added additional
information regarding the identity of a beneficiary); In re Estate of Wells, 983 P.2d 279, 281 (Kan. Ct.
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negative outcome resulting in the invalidation of the decedent’s new will
would not undermine the decedent’s freedom of disposition because the
decedent’s prior will directs the disposition of her property in the same
manner as her new will. As such, a false-negative outcome would not
produce significant error costs, and consequently, error costs would
become asymmetric under this scenario with false-positive error costs
remaining high and false-negative error costs becoming minimal.
The important takeaway from this analysis of the potential error costs
produced by false-negative outcomes that result in property being
distributed according to the terms of outdated wills is that a clear and
simple understanding of such error costs is difficult to formulate. In some
instances, false-negative outcomes could produce no error costs because
the decedent’s old will accurately reflects her intended estate plan. By
contrast, in instances in which the decedent’s outdated will disposes of her
estate in an entirely unintended manner, the error costs produced by falsenegative outcomes are incredibly high. Thus, the extent to which freedom
of disposition is undermined is difficult to generalize and therefore it is
unclear whether false-negative outcomes that result in the distribution of
property according to the terms of an outdated will affect the symmetry of
probate-error costs.
In sum, when it is assumed that false-negative outcomes result in
intestate distribution of the decedent’s estate, a fairly clear picture of
probate-error costs emerges. Under this assumption, probate-error costs
were previously asymmetric.225 In the past, false-negative outcomes had
relatively low average error costs because intestacy largely fulfilled most
decedents’ intent.226 Conversely, false-positive outcomes had relatively
high average error costs because inauthentic wills could distribute property
to anyone and consequently could substantially deviate from the
decedent’s intended estate plan.227 Furthermore, under the assumption that
false-negative outcomes result in intestate distribution of the decedent’s
estate, probate errors are now more likely symmetric because intestacy
statutes no longer mimic most decedents’ intent to the same extent as they
once did.228
The recognition that some false-negative outcomes result not in
intestacy but in distribution of the decedent’s estate according to an
outdated will complicates the error-costs analysis. Instead of simply
evaluating how well intestacy statutes, on average, match decedents’
App. 1999) (involving a codicil that was executed to correct typographical errors but was essentially
identical to the testator’s will in all material respects).
225
See supra Section II.
226
See supra Section II.B.
227
See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
228
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intended estate plans, this new wrinkle adds greater variability to the
analysis because the consequences of false-negative outcomes are no
longer tied to the default estate plan of intestacy. However, just because it
is difficult to formulate a clear picture of error costs when false-negative
outcomes result in the distribution of property pursuant to an outdated will
does not mean the law of will-authentication should favor false-negative
outcomes over false-positive outcomes.230 Indeed, because the majority of
this Article’s error cost analysis suggests that error costs have generally
shifted to a more symmetric balance, the analysis ultimately bolsters the
reform movement’s argument that the law should no longer favor falsenegative outcomes and should instead focus on making correct
determinations of a will’s authenticity as frequently as possible.231
CONCLUSION
Probate courts must authenticate wills with imperfect information, and
consequently, they sometimes make incorrect determinations regarding a
will’s authenticity.232 When an inauthentic will is incorrectly admitted to
probate, a false-positive outcome occurs.233 Conversely, when an authentic
will is incorrectly denied probate, a false-negative outcome occurs.234
Because probate errors, whether false-positive outcomes or false-negative
outcomes, are unavoidable, much of the discourse surrounding the
authentication of wills has focused on the relationship between falsepositive outcomes and false-negative outcomes. Specifically, over the last
several decades, a vocal reform movement has argued that the
conventional law is designed to minimize false-positive outcomes and
229

See supra Sections II.B, III.B.
The difficulties of evaluating the error costs associated with false-negative outcomes that result
in the distribution of the decedent’s estate according to an outdated will could greatly complicate the
analysis of this Article if most false-negative outcomes were of this type. However, the answer to this
empirical question is not clear. Compare Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory
of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 13 (1992) (“Wills frequently mature years after they are executed,
and the cost (both economic and psychological) of adding codicils may deter testators from updating
estate plans to take into account changed circumstances. Estate plans become increasingly stale as time
passes, and due to human inertia they tend to remain so.”) (internal citations omitted), with Vars, supra
note 29, at 1717 n.63 (“[M]any individuals execute multiple wills during their lifetimes . . . .”).
231
See supra Section I.B.
232
See id.
233
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153 (defining false positives as spurious findings
of authenticity); Kelly, supra note 1, at 880 (describing false positives to include probated documents
that lack testamentary intent or that have improperly altered terms); Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647
(defining false positives as spurious findings of authenticity).
234
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153 (describing false negatives to involve the
denial of probate in spite of overwhelming evidence of authenticity); Kelly, supra note 1, at 880
(describing false negatives to involve failure to correct mistakes or to probate documents with
testamentary intent); Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 647 (describing false negatives to involve the denial of
probate in spite of overwhelming evidence of authenticity).
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therefore produces too many false-negative outcomes. Moreover, this
movement argues that law should not focus on minimizing only one type
of error but should instead focus on minimizing the overall rate of error. 236
Put simply, the reform movement argues that the goal of will
authentication should be accuracy.
This Article applies decision theory to will authentication to more fully
explain why the law’s goal should be accuracy in distinguishing authentic
wills from inauthentic wills. Recognizing that decision-making errors are
inevitable, decision theory suggests that a decision-making process should
be designed to minimize expected error costs, which are the product of the
likelihood of a particular type of error and the cost of that error.237 If error
costs are symmetric, such that false-positive outcomes and false-negative
outcomes are equally costly, then a decision-making process should be
designed to minimize the overall rate of error.238 However, if error costs
are asymmetric, such that one type of error is on average more costly than
the other, then overall accuracy should not necessarily be the goal of a
decision-making process. Instead, the goal should be to strike the
appropriate tradeoff between false-positive outcomes and false-negative
outcomes.239 If false-positive outcomes are generally more costly than
false-negative outcomes, as the conventional law of will authentication
assumes,240 then a decision-making process that produces more falsenegative outcomes might be appropriate. By contrast, if false-negative
outcomes are typically more costly than false-positive outcomes, then a
decision-making process that produces more false-positive outcomes might
be appropriate.
Using decision theory as its analytical framework, this Article argues
that probate-error costs were once asymmetric with false-positive
outcomes on average being more costly than false-negative outcomes241
but that error costs are likely now more symmetric.242 This shift from
asymmetric error costs to symmetric error costs was driven by two factors.
The first factor driving this shift toward symmetry is that freedom of
disposition is now unquestionably the organizing principle of the law of
235
See Glover, supra note 3, at 348 (discussing how the perceived higher cost of false-positive
outcomes has shaped efforts to minimize probate error).
236
See id. at 349 (discussing how false-positive outcomes are equally as costly as false-negative
outcomes).
237
Bone, supra note 28, at 911.
238
Vars, supra note 29, at 41.
239
See Hylton & Salinger, supra note 17, at 502 (illustrating the minimization of the expected
costs of an error such as a false acquittal); Zywicki, supra note 30, at 864 (describing how error costs
are minimized by measuring frequency and severity of harm resulting from their occurrence).
240
See supra Section I.B.
241
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242
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succession. In the past, familial disinheritance was an error cost that was
likely considered in the error costs analysis, and consequently, falsenegative outcomes produced lower average error costs than false-positive
outcomes because false-negative outcomes resulted in the decedent’s
property being distributed to family members through intestacy and falsepositive outcomes resulted in distribution of the decedent’s estate through
the terms of an inauthentic will that could potentially disinherit the
decedent’s family.244 However, with freedom of disposition now firmly at
the center of the modern law of succession, familial disinheritance is not
part of the error costs analysis; indeed, the only probate-error costs that
should be evaluated are unintended disposition of property.245 Therefore,
because both false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes can
produce entirely unintended dispositions of property, probate-error costs
are more likely symmetric than they once were.
The second factor affecting relative probate-error costs is that the
default estate plan of intestacy no longer fulfills the probable intent of
decedents to the same extent as it once did.246 In the past, most decedents’
intended estate plans were more uniform and predictable, and as such,
intestacy statutes could be crafted to align with most decedents’
preferences.247 The average error costs of false-negative outcomes were
minimized because most decedents’ intended estate plans were
substantially carried out. By contrast, under modern conditions in which
familial structures are more varied, the probable intent of most decedents is
more difficult to identify.248 Intestacy statutes no longer minimize the error
costs of false-negative outcomes, and therefore both false-positive
outcomes and false-negative outcomes likely undermine the decedent’s
freedom of disposition largely to the same extent.249 Thus, both the
removal of familial disinheritance from the error-cost analysis and the
increased difficulty in crafting intestacy statutes that match most
decedents’ preferences have resulted in probate-error costs becoming more
symmetric.
The recognition of the shift from asymmetric probate-error costs to
symmetric probate-error costs has two important implications. First, it
explains the conventional law’s preference for false-negative outcomes.
Under conditions of asymmetric probate-error costs, the rationale
underlying the conventional law’s false-negative-heavy tradeoff between
243
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probate-error costs becomes clear. If false-positive outcomes are more
costly than false-negative outcomes, the law should minimize falsepositive outcomes at the expense of an increased risk of false-negative
outcomes. Second and more importantly, the shift bolsters the argument
that the law’s method of will-authentication should not favor false-negative
outcomes but instead should focus on accuracy. Indeed, when probateerror costs are symmetric, the law’s method of will-authentication should
not favor one type of error over the other, but instead should attempt to
reach the correct determination of authenticity as frequently as possible.
Thus, with a better understanding of the rationale underlying the
conventional method of will authentication and a clearer picture of
probate-error costs under modern conditions, policymakers may be more
willing to change the way that courts authenticate wills.
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